

A DOCTRINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF POPULACE
AND RESOURCES CONTROL OPERATIONS
BY A ROAD INFANTRY DIVISION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by
CHARLES W. DYKE, Major, U. S. Army

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to develop a more definitive doctrine for the conduct of populace and resources control activities by a ROAD Infantry division assigned an internal defense mission. Internal defense is a relatively new term in the U. S. Army. It was probably coined to supplant the negative tone of the term counterinsurgency with a positive and more accurate descriptive title for the full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

To accomplish these tasks, internal defense has three primary programs. Counterguerrilla warfare operations are conducted to destroy the guerrilla element of an insurgency. This is primarily a military responsibility. Populace and resources control measures are applied to detect and neutralize the insurgency apparatus and operations in the community, sever population support of the guerrilla, and provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the population. This is primarily a police responsibility. However, when the insurgent activity exceeds the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies, military forces are employed in populace and resources control operations. Environmental improvement activities, the third major program, is designed to achieve improvement in the social, economic, and political environment from national to community level. Military forces participate in this program through military civic action projects.

These three basic programs are largely dependent on two other

national programs. These are intelligence and psychological operations. At the national level, these five programs are coordinated by the National Internal Defense Plan, prepared by the central government.

United States' assistance efforts are coordinated by the Country Team, composed of senior representatives of each United States government agency in the country. The Country Team is headed by the Ambassador or the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission. Membership normally includes the chiefs of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States Information Agency's Information Service (USIS), and other agencies that may be operating in the country. The Country Team develops the Country Internal Defense Plan to achieve approved United States objectives and to delineate United States resources required for its accomplishment. As events since 1965 have shown, these resources may include United States ground combat units, to include one or more ROAD Infantry divisions.

By examining United States Army doctrine for the conduct of internal defense operations, it was determined that the role of the advisor and of Special Action Forces specially trained to assist a nation prevent or defeat an insurgency was emphasized, and that there was no single expression of doctrine pertaining to the conduct of internal defense operations by the ROAD Infantry division. The fragmentation of existing doctrine into statements contained in several field manuals and other publications robs the material of an overall cohesiveness needed to convey fundamental relationships between internal defense programs. The relative merit of each point, the desirable sequence of

actions, and the priority of tasks are all dependent on the interpretation of each commander. In addition, current doctrine fails to make clear the basic difference between guerrilla warfare waged by irregular forces against the regular military forces of an invading or occupying power and the essentially political, social and economic struggle of an insurgency.

To develop a more definitive doctrine for the conduct of populace and resources control activities by a ROAD Infantry division, assigned an internal defense mission, three historical examples of internal defense operations were examined in detail. The examples chosen for study were the actions by the Republic of the Philippines to suppress the Huk insurgency from 1946 to 1957, the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, and internal defense operations in Vietnam from 1945 to 1963 under both the French and, after the 1954 division of the country, President Diem's regime in the South. From the study of each historical example, a set of principles for the conduct of populace and resources control activities was derived. These principles were then synthesized into a set of criteria for use in evaluating current doctrine and the development of a more definitive populace and resources control doctrine for the ROAD Infantry division.

In order to properly evaluate current doctrine for populace and resources control activities, it was first necessary to reduce the material available into a single statement. This doctrine does not appear elsewhere in this form, oriented exclusively on internal defense operations.

As a result of the examination of current doctrine by the criteria developed it was concluded that;

1. The doctrine for the conduct of populace and resources control activities by a ROAD Infantry division is adequate as stated in Chapter V of this paper. However, as the material exists in published field manuals, it does not provide an overall, cohesive concept for populace and resources control activities in an internal defense environment.

2. The existence of well defined, clearly understandable statement of doctrine would facilitate the conduct of populace and resources control activities by the ROAD Infantry division.

Major recommendations are that:

1. U. S. Army doctrine for the conduct of internal defense operations by a ROAD Infantry division, to include the conduct of populace and resources control activities, be provided the division commander in a single document.

2. Doctrine for the conduct of populace and resources control by a ROAD Infantry division include the following key points:

a. Populace and resources control operations by the ROAD Infantry division are emphasized in clear and hold operations.

Clear and hold operations:

- (1) Expand outward from a secure base.
- (2) Maximize the use of indigenous security forces.
- (3) Provide for the early establishment of an intelligence net.
- (4) Require unity of effort of all forces involved for success.
- (5) Employ psychological operations and consolidation propaganda to promote the cooperation of the populace.

(6) Require that only essential populace and resources control measures which are authorized by the host nation, and which can be enforced, are instituted.

(7) Include civic action programs that stress participation by the populace.

b. The successful conduct of populace and resources control operations requires flexibility.

3. Additional studies be made to determine what modifications, if any, are necessary to the ROAD Infantry Division Table of Organization and Equipment to enhance its capability for conducting populace and resources control activities.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to develop a more definitive doctrine for the conduct of populace and resources control (PRC) activities by a United States ROAD Infantry division assigned an internal defense mission. Internal defense is recognized by Department of the Army as being a type of special warfare, along with unconventional warfare and psychological operations.

Inasmuch as this paper is concerned with the evaluation and development of doctrine, it is essential that the term be defined. AR 320-5: Dictionary of United States Army Terms defines doctrine as the "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."¹

FM 61-100: The Division makes three specific points concerning the role of a division in internal defense operations. These are:

1. The division, with its normal attachments, is particularly well suited to counterinsurgency type [internal defense] operations. To attain maximum effectiveness, however, intensive training must be completed in psychological operations, counter guerrilla operations, civic action, country or area orientation, and language training.
2. The division can be required to furnish assistance ranging from mobile training teams attached to deployed special action forces (SAF) to brigade size back up forces (FM 31-22).

¹U.S., Department of the Army, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, C-2, AR 320-5 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 21 February 1966), p. 147.

3. In the more advanced stages of insurgency, the entire division can be committed in a counterinsurgency [internal defense] role.²

Further, the division commander is advised that "organizations, operations, and employment of the division and its subordinate units in the roles described above are found in FM 31-15, FM 31-16, FM 31-22, FM 33-5, and FM 41-10."³

The value to the division commander of the doctrine contained in or referenced by the four points cited above is reduced in effectiveness by the following considerations:

1. The employment of an entire division in an internal defense role may take place prior to the insurgency reaching Phase III, or the "advanced stages" referred to in the third point above. For the purposes of this paper, the commitment of all subordinate units of a division to dispersed areas as back-up forces for deployed SAF or MAAG, is not considered to be the commitment of a division to an internal defense role, unless the subordinate units are responsive to the division commander.
2. The material contained in the field manuals referenced provides doctrine which guides employment of the division in an internal defense role. However, the material ranges from the broad and general approach of FM 41-10: Civil Affairs Operations, to the specific techniques of counter guerrilla operations applicable to the battalion and the brigade in FM 31-16: Counter guerrilla Operations. A statement of doctrine for internal defense

²U.S., Department of the Army, The Division, FM 61-100 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1965), p. 149.

³Ibid.

operations representing a synthesis of these two extremes, and addressed to the division level, would be more meaningful to the commander tasked with the responsibility for employing a ROAD Infantry division in internal defense operations than is the present statement of existing doctrine.

3. The training necessary to maximize the inherent suitability of the division for internal defense operations must be conducted within the framework of the doctrine that will guide the employment of the division in actual internal defense operations. This is necessary for the same reason that a division preparing for combat on the conventional battlefield must train in accordance with established doctrine for that type of fight. The attainment of individual and unit proficiency in specific skills and techniques required by an internal defense mission is not the issue. It is, instead, the ability of the division commander to synchronize the efforts of the many separate elements of the division to create one dynamic entity in which each unit, each action, contributes to the timely and efficient accomplishment of the assigned internal defense mission. By comparison, combined arms training is an essential element of the basic and advanced unit training and maneuver phases of the division preparing for conventional warfare.

The comparison of the requirements of the conventional battlefield and of internal defense operations can be extended to gain additional insight into the relationship between PRC activities and the overall internal defense effort. In training for offensive conventional warfare, the combat commander at every level is taught that an objective,

once taken, must be secured against counterattack. To determine how this will be accomplished, the commander and his staff visualize, during the planning phase, the conduct of the attack and the disposition of forces on the objective. During the actual conduct of the battle, the commander and his staff continually update their estimates and alter initial orders and plans with timely command guidance and fragmentary orders to subordinate commanders. Based on his analysis and appropriate staff recommendations, the commander may decide to secure his objective against counterattack by continuing the attack, by occupying the objective or the approaches to it with enough combat power to repel a counterattack, or by a denial plan involving the use of conventional fires, nuclear weapons or appropriate chemical or biological agents. It is clear, then, that the commander, in the absence of restrictions that would preclude the adoption of a particular course of action, has several alternatives available in determining how to accomplish the task of securing his objective against counterattack. He is aided in his decision by established doctrine.

The objective of an internal defense operation by a U.S. ROAD Infantry division is to assist the host nation realize its internal defense goal of establishing, maintaining or preserving a government which can operate effectively under law to meet the needs and aspirations of its people.⁴ The loyalty, willing cooperation, and good will of the people are obviously desirable in attaining this objective and

⁴U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 41-10 (draft) (Fort Gordon, Georgia: Civil Affairs Agency, CDC, March 1966), p. 115. In a telephone interview, Lt. Col. Roy W. Preston, 037756, Project Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command, Civil Affairs Agency, Fort Gordon, Georgia, 17 May 1967, stated that this manual, although now in draft form, would be published in the near future without significant modifications to the material referenced in this paper.

necessary in the long run for the continuance of the government without support by force. The securing of such an objective against counterattack assumes a dimension beyond the scope of considerations applicable to the conventional battlefield, while encompassing of necessity many of the physical security requirements associated with conventional operations. PRC activities, then, should serve to protect the internal defense objective, the people, against counterattack by the insurgent apparatus.

A more definitive doctrine for the conduct of internal defense operations by United States Army divisions is needed. This paper assists by recommending certain modifications to the current doctrine for the conduct of PRC activities by a ROAD Infantry division assigned an internal defense mission.

To provide a framework for this thesis it is necessary to examine existing U.S. Army internal defense doctrine in more detail, to consider the programs it encompasses, and to review the phases of insurgency it seeks to counter.

Internal defense is a relatively new term in the U.S. Army. It was probably coined to supplant the negative tone of the term counterinsurgency with a positive and more accurate descriptive title for "the full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency."⁵

To accomplish these tasks, an effective internal defense plan has three basic programs, as outlined below:

1. Counter guerrilla Warfare: Operations conducted to neutralize

⁵U.S., Department of the Army, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 215.

the guerrilla element of the insurgency movement. This is basically a military function and responsibility.⁶

2. Populace and Resources Control: Measures . . . applied to detect and neutralize the insurgency apparatus and operations in the community, sever population support of the guerrilla; and provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the population. This is primarily a law enforcement responsibility. However, when the insurgent activity exceeds the capabilities of law enforcement agencies, military forces are employed in populace and resources control operations.⁷

3. Environmental Improvement: Activities . . . designed to achieve improvement in the social, economic, and political environment from national to community level. While this is primarily a governmental responsibility, military forces contribute to environmental improvement through military civic action.⁸

The internal defense plan is dependent to a large extent on the effectiveness of two other national programs: intelligence and psychological operations. These activities must be well planned and closely integrated with the internal defense effort.⁹

The intelligence needed to combat insurgency, because of the nature of the threat, takes on more importance than intelligence required on the conventional battlefield. A truly effective internal defense plan is one that prevents insurgency. To accomplish this, the grievances and aspirations of the populace, the economic and social ills of the country, and the capabilities, resources and personalities that can be exploited to achieve the goals of the internal defense effort must be known. This type intelligence is essential to the task of destroying the root causes of insurgency. If the insurgency is not

⁶U.S., Department of the Army, Psychological Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, FM 33-1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 35.

⁷Ibid., 34.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., 25-40.

prevented, it must be defeated. Sound and timely intelligence, based on realistically established essential elements of information, is a prerequisite for success in internal defense operations. Each of the internal defense programs must have a solid foundation in fact.¹⁰

Psychological operations support all internal defense programs and can be a major weapon in the government's effort to prevent or defeat insurgency. Psychological operations are "conducted to change the attitudes, emotions, opinions and behavior of the population, the government, and the insurgents. . . . Specific psychological operations are conducted to cause planned changes by the government."¹¹

The nature of a government's internal defense effort is determined by the level of insurgency it seeks to prevent or counter. As the insurgency develops from a potential threat to a full war of movement, it is classified as being in one of the three phases, listed below:

Phase I: Insurgency in this phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat - latent or already incipient - to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence, or uncontrolled insurgent activity.¹²

Phase II: This phase is attained when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare, or other forms of violence against the established authority.¹³

¹⁰Ibid., LPI-II-22.

¹¹U.S., Department of the Army, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, FM 33-5 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1966), p. 22.

¹²U.S., Department of the Army, Psychological Operations: Army Doctrine, FM 33-1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1965), p. 27.

¹³Ibid.

Phase II: Phase III insurgency is reached when the guerrilla warfare operations are transformed primarily to an open war of conventional movement between organized regular forces of the insurgents, and those of the established authority.¹⁴

There is a wide variation in the relative emphasis placed on each of the three basic internal defense programs as the insurgency progresses. This is shown by the chart below:

RELATIONSHIP OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT
TO THE PHASE OF INSURGENCY^a

INTERNAL DEFENSE PROGRAM	PHASE OF INSURGENCY		
	I	II	III
COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE	12%	35%	80%
POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL	12%	50%	08%
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT	76%	15%	12%

^aChart is constructed from: U.S., Department of the Army, Psychological Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, FM 33-1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 35-42. Percentage figures are approximate.

PRC activities are relatively more important when countering an insurgency in Phase II. However, a division could be assigned a counter-guerrilla mission that would minimize responsibility for populace and resources control and environmental improvement activities. The coordination and integration of the three programs would then take place at a level above division. There are a large number of other possible missions for a division in an internal defense environment. Each mission may require significant variations in the emphasis placed on each of the three internal defense programs. To insure that the doctrine proposed in this thesis is realistic and applicable to all internal defense missions that may be assigned a division, it is assumed from the outset

¹⁴Ibid.

that the division mission will be one which places emphasis on PRC, such as a clear and hold operation in a contested area where the insurgency is in Phase II. Such missions will place maximum emphasis on PRC, while requiring the division commander to coordinate and control significant counter guerrilla warfare and environmental improvement efforts. The doctrine proposed would be equally applicable in the conduct of PRC activities in conjunction with any other internal defense mission, but may assume less importance when the division is employed in a counter guerrilla role.

Clear and hold operations, sometimes referred to as the "expanding oil spot" method, are defined as

a combined military-civil internal defense effort in an area experiencing armed insurgency to:

1. Create a secure environment.
2. Establish firm government control of the population and the area.
3. Gain the population's willing support of and participation in the government's programs.¹⁵

In addition, a clear and hold operation creates a secure base for the support of continuing operations to expand the area under government control.

This dissection of internal defense operations and the insurgency the concepts outlined seek to prevent or defeat has robbed this form of warfare of its dynamic ability to adjust and change, and to adopt totally different methods of operation and levels of intensity in the same country simultaneously. This aspect will be highlighted in the first three chapters.

Three case histories of internal defense operations conducted

¹⁵U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, "Principles of Internal Defense Operations: Subject M 2303-2," Section VII, Lesson II, Summary, p. L 2 - VII - 4.

since World War II will be examined to identify the PRC methods used, to evaluate their effectiveness, and to isolate principles instrumental in success or failure. The insurgency situations in the Republic of the Philippines, Malaya and Vietnam have been selected as historical examples. The internal defense effort of the Philippines was selected for study because it was successful without the direct assistance of foreign troops. Malaya's problems were selected for examination because the effort there too was successful, but unlike the Philippines, foreign troops were extensively employed. The situation in Vietnam is examined because U.S. troops, including four ROAD Infantry divisions, are actively engaged in internal defense operations there. The scope of the analysis of each of the selected internal defense situations will be limited by the nature of this paper. Each internal defense case study will emphasize the relationship between PRC and other internal defense programs inaugurated by the government. From each situation a list of principles will be derived for use as criteria for developing a more definitive PRC doctrine for the ROAD Infantry division assigned an internal defense mission.

PART I. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES: ESTABLISHING THE CRITERIA

CHAPTER I

THE PHILIPPINE RESPONSE TO INSURGENCY

On July 4, 1946 the Republic of the Philippines became a free and independent nation, the first in Asia to achieve this status after World War II.¹ This event had been planned in 1943 and was carried into execution on schedule in spite of the havoc caused in the Islands by World War II.

The freeing of the Philippines was the culmination of years of preparation and training by United States and Filipino leaders. The United States acquired the Philippines as a result of the Spanish-American war of 1898. It was a possession the United States had not sought but which it could not ignore. The American policy from the outset was to govern the Philippines for the benefit of the Filipinos and to prepare them for democratic self-government.

While quelling the insurrection that ensued, government in the Islands quickly passed from the military to a United States civil governor, William Howard Taft. He appointed three Filipinos to the Philippine Commission which held full legislative powers.

By 1907, the Philippines had held its first general election under American rule and in October 1907, the Philippine Assembly

¹Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia: Philippine Victory (New York: The John Day Company, 1955), p. 3.

convened.² Through the years, the Filipinos were granted increased responsibilities for self-government, although progress under some governors was slow. The Filipinos had two delegates to the United States Congress who were able to represent Philippine interests directly.³

Many leaders in the Islands maintained a strong and continuous campaign for full independence. Their views were aired regularly in the Philippine press, one of the world's freest. Powerful factions within the United States supported these aspirations, and in 1934 the Tydings-McDuffie act was signed into law by President Roosevelt. This law, known as the Philippine Commonwealth and Independence act, had a far-reaching influence on the Philippines. It granted commonwealth status to the Islands and made provisions for full independence on July 4, 1946. By May 1935, the new commonwealth had ratified a constitution that provided for a basically sound, democratic government. Two unique features, a provision for a six year presidential term and a unicameral legislature, were modified by an amendment approved in 1940 to a four year presidential term and a bicameral legislature.⁴ The form of government has remained basically unchanged since.

The scope of Japanese aggression and the impact of World War II on the Philippines was not foreseen when the Tydings-McDuffie Act passed in 1934. In December 1941, the Japanese invaded the Islands. By May 1942,

²David Bernstein, The Philippine Story (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947), pp. 81-90.

³D. R. Williams, The United States and The Philippines (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1925), p. 133.

⁴Bernstein, 125-144.

Bataan and Corregidor had fallen. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander, United States Armed Forces Far East, evacuated his headquarters to Australia.⁵ The Commonwealth President, Manuel Quezon, left the Islands with his cabinet and established a government in exile in Washington, D.C., awaiting the day when he could return. President Quezon died in August, 1944 in the United States. He was succeeded by his Vice President, Mr. Sergio Osmena, who went ashore with General MacArthur on Leyte in October, 1944.⁶

The Japanese invasion crushed all central government authority. A Japanese military administration took over the function of governing the country. On October 14, 1943 the Japanese established a puppet Republic of the Philippines, theoretically free and independent. Jose P. Laurel, one of President Quezon's former advisers, was President.⁷

Local government was either destroyed or soon became powerless. A power vacuum at the grass roots level developed as organized resistance folded. This was particularly true in the Central Luzon area. In this vacuum, remnants of units, individual soldiers, and large segments of the population began a highly successful and widely publicized guerrilla warfare campaign against the Japanese. There were many different guerrilla organizations with no effective central control means. The degree of control and organization, at least in Central Luzon, tended to improve with time. The notable exception to this general trend toward coordination and cooperation was the Hukbo Nang Bayon Labon Sa Hapon,

⁵Ibid., 174-182.

⁶Ibid., 182-199.

⁷Hernando J. Abaya, Betrayal in the Philippines (New York: A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1946), pp. 26-58.

the People's Anti-Japanese Army, often contracted to Hukbalahap, or referred to simply as the Huks.⁸

The Huks were unique among the Philippine guerrilla units from the outset. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) issued instructions to all cells in April 1941 to prepare for guerrilla warfare. This was based on the party's analysis of the international situation and the belief of the Communist leaders that the Philippine defenders would be defeated. Two closely related, mutually supporting, and mutually dependent organizations eventually resulted from this directive. These were the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) and the Huks. The BUDC became the agency that guarded the villages (barrios) against the Japanese and puppet soldiers, provided information to the Huks on enemy movement and activities, and fed, supplied and sheltered the Huk combat elements, while denying farm produce to the Japanese.⁹

The Huks were formally organized on March 29, 1942 in Pampanga province, Central Luzon. The forces drawn together under the common name represented many elements and interests, but primarily they were from the pre-war socialist and Communist peasant and labor organizations, with some local patriotic leaders offering their forces to the anti-Japanese cause. Luis Taruc, a dedicated Communist, emerged as the leader. The CPP now had a military arm.¹⁰

⁸Major Kenneth M. Hammer, "Huks in the Philippines", Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Part 4, pp. 177-178.

⁹Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 22.

¹⁰Major Boyd T. Bashore, "Dual Strategy for Limited War", Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Part 4, p. 191.

The CPP's plans for the Huks went beyond harassing, or even defeating the Japanese. The Huks were truly a revolutionary force that planned to seize the opportunity presented by the war to liquidate opposition to their political and economic goals. Their targets were the rich landowners, puppet officials for the Japanese, and pro-American Filipinos, as well as the Japanese forces and the puppet constabulary.¹¹ The movement had agrarian reform overtones, long an issue in over populated Central Luzon. To this "old issue of agrarianism," the Huks added an "effective organization, leadership and a sustaining ideology" to become the strongest guerrilla organization in Central Luzon.¹² "These factors, which led to a mature revolution, had been developed during the twenty years prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Japan."¹³ By contrast, the guerrilla units supported by the United States Army, which included many leaders who were the sons of the landed gentry, were oriented on the enemy, planning against the day of liberation. They had no social and political goals, except the maintenance of the pre-invasion status quo.¹⁴

Luis Taruc undoubtedly realized the advantages of coordinating with the other Filipino and American guerrillas, particularly if he could integrate their efforts into his overall revolutionary scheme. On May 21, 1942 he made liaison with Lieutenant Colonel Claude Thorp who was then the commander of the Filipino and American guerrilla elements in Central Luzon that were recognized and supported by the United States Army. Thorp and Taruc jointly drew up an operations plan. On July 7, 1942

¹¹Scaff, 22-23.

¹²Ibid., 7.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Hammer, 179.

Colonel Thorp's staff and some of Taruc's men extended the operations plan to include the formation of a joint guerrilla command in Central Luzon. Subsequently, Colonel Thorp was caught by the Japanese and killed and the plan was never implemented.¹⁵ When the United States Army refused to supply the Huks, there was bitter resentment among them.¹⁶

The Huks' political activity and the "tactlessness" of some United States officers precluded an effective agreement between the two groups. By mid-1944, open clashes between the Huks and other Central Luzon guerrillas were prevalent. The Huks liquidation program prompted the following message from the assistant executive officer, United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), in January 1944:

I am instructed to also issue warning to all guerrilla units that the killing of any person or the taking of any Filipino, except in case that person may be proved beyond all question of doubt to have attacked with armed force or to have actually betrayed the guerrilla cause to the enemy, will be considered murder or kidnapping with threat to murder.¹⁸

The Huks continued to have armed clashes with the USFIP supported guerrillas until the arrival of American forces. Before the Leyte landing in October 1944, USFIP headquarters informed the Huks that:

Any organization which fails to cooperate will be regarded by incoming troops as unlawful armed bands ... the United States Army does not recognize any political aims or ambitions and it is the position that in time of war, the only political activity which is legal is political activity aimed at maintenance of the loyalty of the masses of the established, the legal government.¹⁹

The growth of the Huk movement during the war was not without internal troubles. In the summer of 1942 a power struggle developed between

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., 178.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., 179.

¹⁹Ibid.

the Communist and socialist elements of the coalition that threatened to ruin the organization. This problem was solved when the Chinese Communists sent a "field general", Ong Kiet, to advise the Huks. Ong crushed the coalition of socialists and hard line Communists that had been causing friction among the leaders. Luis Taruc retained his position of power as the Huk leader.²⁰ "By 1943 the Hukbalahap was completely in international Communist control."²¹

By the time American forces, with guerrilla assistance, had liberated Manila in 1945, the Huks had an impressive record of accomplishments for their cause. They had fought over 1200 engagements with the Japanese and the puppet constabulary, and had killed about 5,000 Japanese. An additional 20,000 Filipino members of the puppet constabulary and other persons labeled obstructionists by the Huks had been killed.²² Civilian officials had been quickly appointed after the Leyte landing in areas where the Huks were strongest.²³ Although these officials were repudiated by President Osmena when he came ashore at Leyte, the appointments nevertheless showed a surprising strength for the Huks. The CPP emerged from World War II far stronger than at any time prior to the war. "The Huks had a fighting strength of at least 5,000 men, 10,000 lightly armed reserves, and about 35,000 unarmed reserves."²⁴ In addition to this military strength

the Huks [CPP] had controlled areas, appointed civil officials, used property, collected taxes, administered justice and even conducted schools. These powers the Huk leaders had come to believe were theirs. They were not going to give them up without a struggle and the struggle began almost immediately after the expulsion of the Japanese in 1945.²⁵

²⁰Bashore, 191.

²¹Ibid.

²²Scaff, 23.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Hammer, 179-180.

²⁵Scaff, 24.

Taruc and several other Huk leaders, including Casto Alejandrino, his deputy, were arrested by the United States Army in February, 1945 on charges of murder and sedition. These charges resulted from their failure to cease Huk wartime guerrilla activity when instructed to do so. However, the evidence was considered insufficient and both were released in September, 1945. They rejoined their still armed guerrillas.²⁶

On July 4, 1945 General MacArthur declared the Philippines to be liberated. Manila lay in ruins. Routes of communications were heavily damaged, with more than 5,000 bridges destroyed. All industry had virtually ceased to exist. The economy was at a standstill. Basic commodity prices rose to six times the 1939 index. As many as one million Filipinos had lost their lives in the war, including much of the leadership. Agricultural activity was curtailed sharply due to the virtual destruction of the national carabao herd. Armed guerrilla units still roamed the countryside. There were many problems to solve, with the promised independence only one year away.²⁷

With American assistance, President Osmena's government set about reestablishing order. There were important factors which hindered progress. After more than three years of Japanese occupation, the people wanted consumer goods. With the money funneled into the Islands by United States assistance, imports soared well above the meager exports, further hurting the economy.²⁸ Scandals in government were rampant, and

²⁶Ibid., 26.

²⁷Robert Aura Smith, Philippine Freedom: 1946-1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 115-119.

²⁸Ibid., 117.

high-placed officials and congressmen sometimes flaunted their lack of respect for basic honesty.²⁹ Both Filipinos and Americans were engaged in war surplus, or "buy-sell" rackets. The United States gave the Philippine government war surplus property which had an original purchase value of one billion dollars, but valued in the Philippines at \$220,000,000. It was ineffectively guarded. Wholesale theft, to include the theft of weapons and ammunition which became Huk property, was the result.³⁰ The Philippine government finally realized only about \$40,000,000 from the sale, or less than twenty percent of that anticipated.³¹

Back pay rackets flourished. Many of the guerrillas who had fought the Japanese during the occupation often had difficulty meeting the criteria for official recognition, and therefore received no pay.³² They could observe, however, that those who were ready to bribe the officials, or to work in the political machine of an influential politician, were recognized and received back pay. Some of those paid were known to the former guerrillas as collaborators with the Japanese.³³ The lack of a firm, clear, announced policy on the back pay issue and the ensuing graft and corruption connected with the payments caused bitter resentment among many war-time guerrillas. The Huks were not recognized and received no back pay, with the exception of one regiment that was attached to the Eighth United States Army.³⁴ The Huks, of course,

²⁹Romulo, 83-86. ³⁰Smith, 119-121. Scaff, 26.

³¹Smith, 121. ³²Scaff, 119-120.

³³Ibid., 26. Abaya, 219-220. ³⁴Hammer, 179-180.

did not turn in their weapons.³⁵ The government policy on back pay, the general graft and corruption, and the get-rich-quick attitude in Manila made recruiting easier for the Huks.

In April, 1946 the first post-war general election was held in preparation for independence. President Osmena was defeated, and Manuel Roxas, who had held a position in Laurel's puppet government under the Japanese, was elected the last president of the Commonwealth and the first president of the free Republic.³⁶

Luis Taruc was elected to the legislature in the same election. When he arrived in Manila, he and seven other Huks, or CPP affiliated men, were denied their seats by fellow legislators. Taruc returned to the ricefields of Central Luzon and declared an open break with the government.³⁷ Soon, armed Huks in bands 100 to 1000 strong roamed the area north of Manila. Government officials and agents were murdered, kidnapped or intimidated. The Philippine Constabulary was often outnumbered, and man for man, the Huks were about equal in fire power. More and more of the Constabulary were tied to static defensive positions.³⁸ The troops were poorly trained and often poorly led.³⁹ The troops helped themselves to the villagers' property without payment, resorted to brutal, extremist measures in attempts to get information, and succeeded only in alienating the populace. Huk units offered their services to villagers as protection

³⁵Albert Ravenholt, The Philippines: A Young Republic on the Move (Princeton, New Jersey: D. VanNostrand Company, Inc., 1962), p. 79.

³⁶Smith, 113-114. . ³⁷Ibid., 141. ³⁸Scaff, 28.

³⁹Bashore, 193.

against the government forces. Reports to Manila exaggerated the minor successes of the government troops.⁴⁰

President Roxas continued his "mailed first" policy of full force against the Huks, a policy he adopted at the time of Philippine independence. There were those in the Roxas administration who believed this policy to be short-sighted. They worked for a truce with the Huks to give time to work out differences. As a result of these efforts, a three months truce was arranged in 1947. Little was accomplished during the truce. Neither side trusted the other and the fighting resumed as bitter as ever.⁴¹

When Taruc left jail in September 1945, the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) was still in operation as one arm of the CPP. In 1946, the BUDC was replaced with the PKM (National Peasants Union). This organization inherited the resources and the tasks of the BUDC. The KPMP (National Union of Peasants in the Philippines), a Communist union dating to the 1920's, and the AMT (Workers and Peasants Union), a socialist union of the 1930's, had provided the basis for the BUDC and now contributed to the mass base of the PKM.⁴²

In March, 1948 President Roxas declared the Huks to be:

Illegal associations organized and maintained to commit acts of sedition and other crimes, for the purpose of overthrowing our present government under the Constitution by wresting the reins of government from the lawfully-elected representatives of the people and establishing a government of their own through force and intimidation.

The Hukbalahap and the PKM are allied and complementary associations. Although the former is directly charged with the undertaking

⁴⁰Smith, 144.

⁴¹Scaff, 28-29.

⁴²Ibid., 29, 153. Bashore, 191.

of military operations, and the latter with the political, economic and propaganda activities, they act jointly and in close collaboration.⁴³

In April 1948, President Roxas died in office. He was succeeded by his Vice President, Elpidio Quirino.⁴⁴ President Quirino reversed the mailed first policy of his predecessor and tried to solve the Huk problem by "conciliation and sweet reasonableness."⁴⁵ With assistance of the Manila Chronicle, the Huk leaders were contacted. The president's brother, Antonio Quirino, negotiated with Luis Taruc over a period of several weeks. President Quirino proposed an amnesty for the Huks and the restoration of Taruc's seat in the House of Representatives. The Huk leaders, after some deliberation, accepted. Taruc was received with official fanfare in Manila and took his seat. But only a token number of Huks turned in weapons. They demanded extensive reforms immediately. The president replied that such reforms would take years to accomplish. The amnesty ended, fighting resumed, and Taruc, after collecting his back pay as a congressman, disappeared into the area called by this time "Huklandia", which consisted of the four provinces Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, and Bulacan, north of Manila in Central Luzon.⁴⁶

The war continued. Government forces remained generally ineffective, and the Huks continued to grow.⁴⁷ The Philippines' economic problems had been somewhat alleviated, but the basic social problems caused by absentee landlordism and usurious interest rates continued, particularly in Huklandia. Huk organizations gained strength in the

⁴³Scaff, 29.

⁴⁴Ravenholt, 79.

⁴⁵Scaff, 30.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., 31.

Luzon provinces south of Manila and in the Visayan Islands south of Luzon.⁴⁸

In 1949, the CPP changed the name of the Huks to Hukbong Magpolaya Nang Bayon, or HMB, translated as the People's Liberation Army.⁴⁹ The term "Huk" has remained in popular usage, however, and will be used in lieu of HMB in this paper.

The national elections of 1949 represented a low point in the Philippine hold on democracy. Voters were intimidated. Ballot boxes were padded, or stolen, and violence reigned. It was the "dirty election."⁵⁰ The actual incidents were propagandized into even larger affairs by the Huks and the PKM. Sure of victory by 1951, the Huks increased the size of their raids after the election.

In April 1950, the Huks threatened Manila with an attack by 10,000 armed personnel located on the outskirts of the city supported by agents and fifth-column arsonists in each district of the capital. The threat ceased when the Army was ordered to disperse them. This represented the pinnacle of Huk strength. At this time they numbered about 15,000 armed and 80,000 other active Huks, with a mass support base possibly as large as 500,000.⁵¹ Figures on the exact strength vary, but they were strong enough to seek "to alienate, divide, and conquer" the young Republic.⁵²

⁴⁸Ibid., 34-35, 54.

⁴⁹Bashore, 193-194.

⁵⁰Romulo, 87-93. Scaff, 30-35.

⁵¹Lt. Col. Thomas C. Tirona "The Philippine Anti-Communist Campaign", Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Part 4, p. 206.

⁵²Ibid.

President Quirino realized that action was needed. He went on speaking trips to the provinces. He spoke to Constabulary units and urged them to protect the populace, and he threatened to court martial erring soldiers. Even so, one Army major, in a public journal, said:

The increase in the number of dissident elements and their sympathizers in Central Luzon during the past few years may largely be attributed to the misconduct of officers and men who have been entrusted with the enforcement of the law and order."⁵³

President Quirino and his government became aware of a number of critical points in dealing with the Huks. The Huk force had to be met with superior government force. This required a reorganization of the Army to fit it for this task. Reorganization was begun in early summer 1950. Together with this force, a policy of attraction, "of dealing justly and humanely" with the Huks, could "undercut the Huk appeal to the common people."⁵⁴ The Huk cry to the common man to rise up and overthrow the unjust government could not be reconciled with the government's policy of rehabilitating those who had erred and returning them to society as useful citizens. The peasant in the barrio was more likely to cooperate with government efforts to identify and capture Huks if he believed the government forces would deal fairly with those captured. President Quirino needed someone to devise ways and means of translating these policies into action, someone who could manage the Philippine Armed Forces and direct them to the goals essential to the elimination of the Huks.

Raymond Magsaysay, a congressman from the mountain province of Zambales north of Manila, was selected for the job. In September, 1950

⁵³Scaff, 35.

⁵⁴Ibid.

he was appointed Secretary of the Department of National Defense. Ramon Magsaysay was not a typical politician. He was not a lawyer as most were, he was a "pure" Malay and, unlike many, he was abrupt, direct, and honest.⁵⁵ More important, his actions were not bound by political debts. Magsaysay was a man of vision and action, easily bored by detail, with a knack for going straight to the heart of a problem. He had been a successful guerrilla leader against the Japanese in his home province during the war. He knew the Filipino people and spoke their dialects.⁵⁶ As General Carlos P. Romulo said: "Truly, the times had found the man."⁵⁷

Although reorganization of the Army had started before Magsaysay took office, there was still much to be done. There was "deadwood" at every level in the armed forces that needed to be ferreted out and removed. This, Secretary Magsaysay did. He was opposed by senior Army officers and by politicians with vested interests.⁵⁸ His personality, persistence, and tenacity alienated many of the old-line politicians who supported President Quirino.⁵⁹

In spite of this opposition, Magsaysay pushed the reorganization of the Army into mobile battalion combat teams (BCTs), and organized an airborne battalion, a cavalry squadron, scout ranger units, and scout dog units. Static defense posts were largely abandoned, and the Army began offensive operations with new vigor. The military areas of the Republic were further divided into districts, with one or more BCTs in each.⁶⁰ With the Army deployed among the people, Magsaysay wanted to restore

⁵⁵Smith, 151-153. Romulo, 118-123.

⁵⁶Smith, 152.

⁵⁷Romulo, 117. ⁵⁸Ibid., 125. ⁵⁹Ibid., 138. ⁶⁰Tirona, 207.

public confidence and trust in the Army as a force concerned with the welfare of the people. He had the soldiers' ration increased to reduce the temptation to take from the countryside. Offenders were dealt with promptly and severely, and in such a manner that the people affected knew that the soldier had been punished.⁶¹ Army doctors provided free medical care to the needy civilians in areas where the government forces operated, and Army lawyers were made available to represent peasants in court action.⁶² The people began to believe in the sincerity and ability of the government.

The mission that Magsaysay had been assigned by the Philippine President when he became the Secretary of Defense was to rid the country of the Huk menace.⁶³ There were two distinct aspects of Magsaysay's plan to accomplish this task. The first was offensive operations to break up the Huk units and convince them of the government's strength. The second was a policy of attraction for those who would surrender and cooperate with the government. To implement the policy of force the newly reorganized armed forces engaged in a vigorous, offensive anti-Huk campaign, and concurrently accomplished civic action projects within their capability to assist in gaining the support of the populace for government actions.⁶⁴ Army intelligence men rooted out the Huk infrastructure in the barrios and provinces.⁶⁵ While there is no evidence of a standard technique employed in the country for coordinating the efforts of the Army operational units with intelligence personnel and government officials, the results indicate that this coordination took place. The commanders

⁶¹Romulo, 131.

⁶²Bashore, 201.

⁶³Smith, 155.

⁶⁴Bashore, 197-201.

⁶⁵Tirona, 207.

received timely intelligence, largely gained from a cooperative populace.⁶⁶ This new Army strength freed the people from Huk intimidation, while the improved troop conduct gained their respect. This resulted in a sharp increase in the quantity of information gained by the Army.⁶⁷

As areas were cleared, civilian commando (home guard) units were organized, adding to the available combat power.⁶⁸ Thus the battle for the loyalty of the people was fought and won. The control of the populace in the provinces by the government was largely the result of voluntary actions by the people in response to the Army's effectiveness in dealing with the Huks.⁶⁹

At the national level, the problem of rooting out the infrastructure was tackled simultaneously with the conduct of the counter guerrilla and populace and resources control activities in the provinces. Information gained by a personal contact with a Huk agent by Magsaysay together with other information gained by Army intelligence led to the virtual destruction of the CPP's Politburo in Manila in October 1950.⁷⁰ Five members of the party secretariat were captured. The ability of the CPP to control Communist activities throughout the Islands was dealt a severe blow.⁷¹

The second aspect of Magsaysay's anti-Huk campaign was rooted in his belief that the basic cause of the Huk menace was the agrarian problems endemic to the heavily populated areas. He reasoned that if peasants had rallied to the Huk cry of "land for the landless", he could persuade

⁶⁶Romulo, 131-136.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Bashore, 197.

⁶⁹Romulo, 131-136.

⁷⁰Ibid., 133-136.

⁷¹Ibid.

them to return to the government fold with a better land offer.⁷² The idea behind the policy of attraction was to give the guerrilla a clear-cut choice of remaining with the Huks with the sure knowledge that government troops were likely to hunt him down and kill him, or to surrender and take advantage of a government offer of an opportunity to own land of his own.⁷³

A resettlement project of the fertile underpopulated Mindanao Islands had been tried on a small scale before World War II. Following the war a second resettlement project was begun, called LASEDECO (Land Settlement and Development Corporation).⁷⁴ This project did not make any significant inroads on the problem of overpopulation in Central Luzon. It was tainted with corruption and inefficiency. Absentee landlords gained large tracts of the more fertile of the government lands.⁷⁵ An Army project to provide retired soldiers with homesteads on Mindanao became entangled with red tape and was shelved.⁷⁶ Magsaysay saw an opportunity to achieve a more permanent solution to the Huk problem with a resettlement program.

The military appropriation for 1951 provided for an increase of ten BCTs, with a provision that any savings from the appropriation could be used in a rehabilitation program for the captured and surrendered Huks.⁷⁷ By this means Magsaysay created the Economic Development Corps, referred to as EDCOR, within the Army. The mission of EDCOR was to select sites in the vast public land holdings on Mindanao Island and prepare

⁷²Scaff, 37.

⁷³Tirona, 206-208.

⁷⁴Romulo, 153.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Scaff, 37.

⁷⁷Ibid., 7-38.

them for settlement by groups of volunteer ex-Huks. The plan called for including selected civilian families and former Army personnel in each group as a stabilizing influence and to assist the settlers in starting a new democratic way of life.⁷⁸ The project encountered significant problems posed by the jungle environment, by the Moslem Moros indigenous to Mindanao, and by the unsuitability of some of the settlers selected. All of these problems were successfully met as the Army gained experience in this new role. The EDCOR farms project provided a new way of life for several hundred former Huk families, while assisting in the development of a potentially productive portion of the Republic.⁷⁹ This project was the reverse of the concept used more extensively in other countries of Southeast Asia faced with insurgency. The dissidents were moved away from the loyal, democratic populace, rather than collecting the loyal people into areas to be defended by government troops. The EDCOR farm project did not reach the size envisioned by Magsaysay, but it was of significant importance in demonstrating to the Huks the sincerity of the government's policy of justice and opportunity.

As the mid-term congressional elections of 1951 approached, it was realized that the people must be given assurance of freedom from corruption and intimidation. This task was given to Magsaysay. He employed regular armed forces and mobilized the Reserve Officer Training Corps in the universities and colleges to guard the polling places and ballot boxes. The result was a clean election, relatively free of violence. Public confidence and morale were raised at the critical point

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Scaff, 37-129.

when field units were gaining the initiative against the Huks.⁸⁰

The psychological warfare plan of the Philippine armed forces was directed to three target groups: the insurgents, the populace or mass base and the armed forces. To the insurgents, a message of unrelenting force was directed to the "hard core" who could not be won to the government's side. To the "soft core", a message of "attraction and fellowship" was beamed. These messages to the Huks were given credence by unrelenting military action against those who continued to resist and good treatment and an opportunity to start anew to those who surrendered.⁸¹

The government sought to keep the mass base informed of the anti-Huk programs and to obtain the support of the populace in implementing the programs. This effort was supported by the improved conduct of the soldiers, and Magsaysay's policy of having Army Civil Affairs personnel take the message directly to the people.⁸²

The Philippine armed forces were informed of the reasons for fighting Communism, the importance of their task and an "overview of the world situation."⁸³

Magsaysay eventually broke with President Quirino because he believed that necessary government reforms were not being implemented fast enough, and that graft and corruption were still too common place in the government.⁸⁴ Switching from President Quirino's Liberal party

⁸⁰ Romulo, 140-142

⁸¹ Tirona, 209.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Smith, 165.

to the opposition Nacionalistas party, he carried his message directly to the people and was elected with an unprecedented majority.⁸⁵ As President, he implemented programs designed to reinforce the government's control of the populace - not by force, but by conveying a conviction that the government was "for the people."⁸⁶

There were two national development projects which Magsaysay gave special emphasis to when he became President. One was the provision of clean water to the barrios and the other was the development of secondary roads. He believed that both were needed by the people. After World War II nearly all drinking water in the barrios was polluted. In 1952, 152 artesian wells were drilled, largely as a result of American pressure to do so. There were over 1300 new artesian wells after his first year in office. A group of Manila businessmen established the Liberty Wells Association, an organization to solicit funds and help defray the \$600 cost of each well. Together, United States citizens and Filipinos contributed \$300,000 to this association in its first year.⁸⁷ The wells served as a constant reminder of government action for the people.

The Philippines had an adequate primary road net before World War II. The rehabilitation of this system was accomplished after the war, but remote barrios and the far corners of provinces were still effectively cut off from market places and sources of government influence. This project was pushed and in the first year of Magsaysay's administration several hundreds of miles of secondary roads were built. This was recognized as being only a start. An electric railway the length of

⁸⁵Ibid., 165-169.

⁸⁶Romulo, 227-242.

⁸⁷Smith, 181-182.

Mindanao Island was planned.⁸⁸

On May 17, 1954 Luis Taruc "gave up", preferring that term to surrender. He was being hounded by government troops and there was some evidence that he may have been arguing with the CPP leaders. Members of his elite guard and staff had been recently captured by Army troops. Taruc was tried on twenty-six separate charges and sentenced to prison for twelve years.⁸⁹

The Huk movement was becoming ineffective as an organized revolutionary force. Some government BCTs were removed from the provinces and others were reduced in strength. By May of 1954, Army patrols held their fire if a fugitive could be otherwise captured. There were still small bands that continued to harass, but the main threat to the survival of democracy in the Philippines was gone.⁹⁰

President Magsaysay was killed in an airplane crash on the island of Cebu on March 17, 1957. Vice President Carlos Garcia succeeded him as president without incident, continuing Magsaysay's policies.⁹¹

At the time of Magsaysay's death there were still Huks in the Republic of the Philippines. As late as February 3, 1967 there have been reports of the government being forced to take action against armed Huk insurgence.⁹² The problem is not yet a dead issue. But Magsaysay was highly successful.

⁸⁸Ibid., 177-180.

⁸⁹Scaff, 130-132.

⁹⁰Bashore, 198.

⁹¹Smith, 235, 237.

⁹²"Move against Reds on Luzon", Kansas City Star, February 3, 1967. p. 5.

Why was Magsaysay successful? Specifically what populace and resources control techniques were instrumental in realizing this success? The answer to both these questions lies partly in Magsaysay's basic approach to the problem. "Not content to pursue Huks and kill Huks, Magsaysay wished to win them back to the government's side through a positive program of social reform."⁹³ Huklandia, other areas of Luzon, and the Visayan Islands were experiencing well developed phase II insurgency. Magsaysay succeeded where those before him failed. The important reasons for this are:

1. The Army was reorganized, rejuvenated and successfully interposed between the Huks and the populace. This action denied the Huks free access to recruits, supplies, shelter and the anonymity gained by mingling with the people. This counter-guerrilla warfare effort was effective.
2. Army discipline was enforced. Soldiers were required to afford the people proper and just treatment. The Army recaptured the public confidence.
3. Intelligence activities were emphasized at all levels. Effective measures were developed and used. As the public confidence in the Army improved, information was gained more readily.
4. Basic social and economic problems were alleviated. The Huks' appeal was undercut by effective government programs. The Army participated with a civic action program and with EDCOR.

⁹³Scaff, 37.

5. An effective nationwide psychological warfare campaign was waged to convince the people of the government's interest in their welfare and of the government's ability to take positive action to assist them.
6. Voluntary return to government control was made attractive to the Huks and the Huk sympathizers.
7. Civilian commando units were formed. This relieved army troops for offensive action and served to involve the local people in the government's program.
8. The programs were carried out simultaneously. Local actions were adapted to local conditions.

Magsaysay's populace and resources control program was basically to regain the loyalty of the people to their government. He was dealing with people who had long since acquired a sense of nationhood, particularly in Central Luzon. Instead of relocation of the populace into defended areas and the imposition of police control measures, he sought to soften the Army's impact among those who cooperated, and to win their loyalty by providing them with an effective government.

CHAPTER II

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY: 1948 - 1960

British interest in the Malayan Peninsula dates back as early as 1612 when the English East Indian Company opened a factory and a trading center in the Malay state of Patani, then under Siamese suzerainty.¹ The project was abandoned in 1623, and British interest was not again seriously aroused until after 1740 when French sea power began to threaten British dominance of the Bay of Bengal and the east coast of India. It wasn't until the Dutch position in the Malaccan Straits began to weaken to the point where the English East India Company could profitably move into that area, however, that positive action was taken to secure a port adjacent to the Bay of Bengal. In 1786, the island of Penang was occupied by agreement with the controlling Malay sultan.² Singapore was settled in 1819 and rapidly grew into an important trade center - the "Malta of the East."³

The basic tenets of British policy in Malaya until 1873 were: (1) non-intervention in Malayan affairs, except where British property or citizens were endangered, (2) the maintenance of free trade in Singapore and (3) the retention of naval bases. In 1873, the policy of non-intervention was abandoned and the policy of establishing a British Resident

¹D.G.E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: MacMillan and Co., LTD., 1964), p. 459.

²Ibid., 461-469, 476.

³Ibid., 471.

to advise the Malay rulers of selected states was adopted. This was done primarily because the native rulers were unable to maintain law and order and to otherwise manage the complex states prosperity and growth produced.⁴ British Residents were, in theory, advisors only, but "in practice the Residents became more and more the actual rulers in their states."⁵

The administrative situation in the Malay Peninsula was stable and responsive to British interests by 1895. The Straits Settlement of Singapore Island, Penang Island and Province Wellesley (a small coastal strip on the mainland opposite Penang Island), and Malacca were under the British Crown and managed by a British Governor with headquarters in Singapore. The Governor supervised the British Residents in the Malay states and reported directly to the Colonial Office in London.⁶

On July 1, 1896 the Malay Federation was inaugurated, uniting the states of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sembilan. In 1909, by the terms of a British treaty with Siam, the four northern states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu came under British control. These four states, together with Jahore at the southern end of the peninsula, were known as the Unfederated States. By 1914, all states had a British advisor, and all advisors reported to the Resident General in Singapore, who was also the High Commissioner of the Federated States.⁷

Malaya's place in the economic scheme of the British colonial system was tied to trade, mainly in Singapore, and to the commodities tin and rubber. The labor required and attracted by these industries

⁴Ibid., 481-520.

⁵Ibid., 526.

⁶Ibid., 530-531.

⁷David McIntyre "Political History: 1896-1946," Malaysia: A Survey, ed. Wang Gungwu (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp.138-139, 141.

determined to a large extent the population pattern of the country.

From the time Singapore was founded in 1819, large numbers of Chinese immigrants came to that city and to other points throughout the Malay Peninsula. These were part of the body known as the "Overseas Chinese," found throughout Southeast Asia.⁸ They came as coolies, servants, and entrepreneurs. They prospered well and in time dominated much of the urban area trade. They furnished a large percentage of the labor force for the cities and, until the advent of more modern and efficient methods about 1882, dominated the tin mining in the Federated States. Capital made available by the Chinese Community was a significant factor in the development of Malaya.⁹

Indians were also encouraged to immigrate to Malaya as laborers. The Indians tended to gravitate to the larger plantations, and after 1900, they were particularly attracted to the larger rubber plantations.¹⁰ This pattern of immigration continued without significant restraints until the 1930's, when the general depression and the lack of jobs forced controls to be established. In 1941 the population of the Malay states (excluding Singapore) was approximately 5,000,000. Forty-nine per cent of these were Malay, and thirty-eight per cent Chinese, with Indians making up most of the remainder.¹¹ The Overseas Chinese and to a lesser extent the Indians tended to maintain close ties with their native land,

⁸Fred Greene, The Far East, (New York: Hall, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 419-421.

⁹Hall, 528.

¹⁰Norton Ginsburg and Chester F. Roberts, Jr., Malaya (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 316-318.

¹¹Ibid., 319-327.

and to maintain their native traditions, customs, language and schools. This tendency continues even today, making it extremely difficult to develop a homogeneous society.¹²

The clannishness of the Overseas Chinese in Malaya, as in other parts of Southeast Asia, made that community responsive to forces and trends in mainland China. The Chinese in Malaya were traditionally influenced by two types of organizations. The first type was the numerous secret societies they brought to Malaya with them. These societies operated by political terrorism, primarily in the Chinese community. The British police generally kept tabs on these societies and from time to time reduced their strength and effectiveness by wholesale arrests and deportations. Other organizations traditionally influential in the Chinese Community were the community and special craft or guild associations. Membership in community associations was determined by the place of origin in China. Unlike the secret societies, the community and special craft associations were not politically effective.¹³

In 1911, the Kuomintang Nationalist revolution took place on Mainland China. The new government solicited help from the Overseas Chinese communities, and

Malaya was an early center of outside support for the Nationalist revolution in China. A strong branch of the Kuomintang was established . . . to maintain among the Chinese an intense interest in the revolutionary movement in China . . . and support Chinese independence and nationalism with funds and personnel.¹⁴

The Kuomintang in Malaya, as in China proper, was closely linked with certain antidynastic secret societies. This linked the movement closely with the existing political force. "Both the British and the Malays tended to view with distrust growing Chinese nationalism in Malaya,

¹²Ibid., 265-362.

¹³Ibid., 282-294, 457.

¹⁴Ibid., 457.

which threatened to orient the allegiance of the majority of the Chinese population toward a political entity other than Malaya."¹⁵ As a result, the Kuomintang was outlawed, although it continued to function clandestinely until 1930. It was then again permitted to operate, but under close government supervision. The organization included a number of Communists, who joined during the period 1924-1927. This reflected the composition and policies of the mainland Kuomintang. In 1927, however, the Communists in both the Malay and the mainland Kuomintang parties split away from the conservative elements. This significantly weakened the Malayan Communists. To offset general reverses of 1927, the Comintern established a regional organization, known as the Nan Yang Communist Party, in 1928 to unite the Chinese Communists of Malaya, Burma, Thailand and Indochina.¹⁶

In 1930, the Nan Yang Communist Party was dissolved and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) inaugurated. In 1930 this party was weakened, but not eliminated, by the wholesale arrest and deportation to mainland China of many of the Communists. This action was taken by authorities in other Southeast Asian areas at the same time, notably by the French in Indochina.¹⁷ The MCP was unable to attract any significant number of the "courteous, easygoing Malays to its stern ideology that made hard work and sacrifice its basic precepts."¹⁸

The MCP activities of the 1930's centered around infiltrating labor unions and causing widespread labor unrest. However, the general depression during this period probably gave the Communists recruits that in

¹⁵ Ibid., 458.

¹⁶ Ibid., 458-459.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Rowland S. N. Mans, "Victory in Malaya," Internal Defense Operations: A Case History; Malaya, 1948-1960. RB 31-2 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The Command and General Staff College, 1966), p. 4.

more prosperous times it would not have gotten. The MCP was active in anti-Japanese demonstrations and, from 1939-1941, in anti-British activities. After Germany's attack against Russia in the summer of 1941, the MCP reversed its stand on the British.¹⁹

Perhaps the most significant accomplishment of the MCP in the 1930's was its ability to completely infiltrate the Kuomintang and seize power from within. They were assisted in this effort by the Japanese attack of mainland China in 1937 and the subsequent closing of the Kuomintang-Communist ranks against the common Japanese enemy. The result was that "with the launching of the Japanese invasion [of Malaya] in 1941, the Communist Party [MCP] was virtually the only well organized resistance group in the country."²⁰

In early 1941, some 200 selected MCP members attended a Special Training School established by the British Army in Singapore. "Its purpose was to give instruction to both soldiers and civilians in irregular warfare in the event Japan entered the war." When Japan did enter the war, the MCP was 37,000 strong.²¹

Three days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British had two capital ships sunk by Japanese aircraft as they steamed up the Malayan coast to challenge a Japanese landing on the Malay Peninsula. The successful landings outflanked the well fortified port of Singapore, which fell on February 15, 1942.²² Allied prestige, and the British in particular, suffered a severe blow.

The Communist organization went underground, into the jungle, when the Japanese arrived. The MCP resistance movement had two arms, as

¹⁹Ginsberg and Roberts, 459.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Mans, 4-5.

²²Hall, 771-772.

in the Philippines. The first was the combat element, called the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). Rendering support to the MPAJA was the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU). This element was charged with furnishing food, shelter, aid and information to the MPAJA.²³ Its function paralleled that of the BUDC in the Philippines.

The Communists had expected the British to be driven from Malaya and had planned accordingly. The policy of cooperating with the British after the German invasion of Russia was an expedient. The eventual goal was to eliminate British control of Malaya and establish a Communist regime in its place. Before the war these efforts were hindered primarily by the lack of interest shown by the Malays and, to a lesser extent, by British and Malay police controls. For the MCP, the war was a strengthening factor.²⁴

The Japanese invasion, in effect, united the Chinese (and some minor segments of the Malay and Indian communities) in common opposition to the Japanese under the leadership of the Malayan Communist Party and provided the MCP with the opportunity to organize a broad base of popular support for its activities and to recruit, train, and indoctrinate an armed force for use not only against the Japanese, but after the end of the war, against the British.²⁵

The British contacted the MPAJA in May 1943 with liaison elements from the Southeast Asia Command. The MPAJA had a strength of about 3,000 men at this time. The British provided training officers, arms and supplies. In 1945 a plan for MPAJA support of a British invasion of Malaya was agreed to by the MCP. Had this plan been implemented, the political strength of the MCP would have been greatly enhanced. However, the

²³Ginsburg and Roberts, 461-462.

²⁴Ibid., 462. Hall, 775, 785-786.

²⁵Ginsburg and Roberts, 462.

Japanese capitulation in August 1945 made the plan unnecessary.²⁶

On VJ Day, the British were aware of more than 4,000 active guerrillas in Malaya.²⁷ But, "when the war ended, about 7,000 guerrillas came out from their jungle campsites and took control of the countryside, establishing their own government in many towns."²⁸ The British returned to Malaya in strength in September 1945. The MPAJA and the MCP were reluctant to relinquish the political power they had seized to the incoming British military administration.⁶⁰ The British recognized the potentially revolutionary nature of the MPAJA and took action to disband it. A payment of \$350 was offered for every weapon surrendered. This plan netted about 6,000 weapons. The Communists, however, insured that they had adequate caches of weapons in the jungle for later use if needed.²⁹ "The Malayan Communist Party emerged from World War II as the dominant political organization in the country."³⁰ The British were not faced, however, with the problem of a Japanese established free republic, as in other parts of Southeast Asia.

To retain control of their wartime power structure, the MCP resorted to the old ruse of front organizations. The Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Union became the People's Democratic Movement, and the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army became the MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades Association, which operated under close MCP supervision. By means of these two organizations, the MCP retained a resemblance of control over a significant portion of their wartime strength. In addition, the MCP infiltrated

²⁶James E. Dougherty, "The Guerrilla War in Malaya", Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Part 7, p. 299.

²⁷Mans, 4.

²⁸Dougherty, 300.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ginsburg and Roberts, 462-463.

and cooperated with other existing organizations to further their cause. The most significant activity in this area was the Communist infiltration of the labor unions.³¹

In late 1945, the MCP organized the General Labor Union (GLU) and "by February the following year it had come to dominate the entire trade union movement in Malaya." A general strike was called in February 1946.³² The government's answer was military action to quell the riotous aspects of the strike and a reinstitution of the Trade Union Enactment of 1940.³³ This required all union officers to have a record of actually having worked in the trade represented by their union. The MCP then reorganized the GLU into the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), a front organization designed to evade this restriction. "By mid-1948 the PMFTU controlled some 214 [463,000 workers] out of a total of 277 registered unions in Malaya, including the key tin, rubber and longshoreman's unions."³⁴ The PMFTU was associated with the Worlds Federation of Trade Unions, a Communist led organization. The MCP, with its control of the Peoples Democratic Movement, the MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades Association, and its influence in the labor unions was a potentially powerful force in Malaya. The party suffered from an internal power struggle, however, that tended to weaken it. This struggle was resolved when Loi Tak, the Secretary General, left with the party funds. He has not been seen since. He was succeeded by Chin Peng in March, 1947.³⁵

During the war, the British pondered the question of how to

³¹Ibid. Dougherty, 300. ³²Ginsburg and Roberts, 463.

³³Anthony Short, "Communism and the Emergency," Malaysia: A Survey, ed. Wang Gungwu (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 152.

³⁴Ginsburg and Roberts, 463.

³⁵Mans, 4-5.

increase Malayan participation in the government. Aside from the impact of the problems associated with restoration of the pre-war economy, there was still the very real problem that the Malays and the Chinese just did not constitute a homogeneous society. Any scheme for self-rule had to provide answers to the basic questions of citizenship in the political entity created and some means of providing safeguards for the rights of all non-Malays. Not only was there a question of how much participation, but also by whom.³⁶

The first British proposal was the MacMichael Plan for a Malayan Union. This plan called for combining all nine Malay states, plus Penang and Malacca, to form one protectorate. Singapore was to remain a separate Crown Colony. Sir Harold MacMichael negotiated treaties after the war with the sultan of each of the nine Malay states by which they all transferred their complete rights to legal sovereignty to Britain. The sultans were to retain control of matters relating to the Mohammedan religion and Malayan affairs by means of a Malay Advisory Council in each state. All government functions were to be centralized in Kuala Lumpur. The plan came to grips with the citizenship problem by extending full citizenship in the proposed union to (a) all persons born in the area of the Union or in Singapore, and (b) immigrants who had lived there for ten of the preceding fifteen years. It provided full citizenship to future immigrants after only five years residence. Full equality of all races was stipulated. "There was to be no discrimination of race or creed."³⁷

The MacMichael Plan was strongly opposed by the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), an amalgamation of several small Malay nationalist movements. The leaders of the UMNO set out to defeat the

³⁶Hall, 787-789.

³⁷Ibid.

Union proposal and take political, social, and economic progress of the Malays toward self-government. By November 1946, the British Union proposal (the MacMichael Plan) had been effectively stopped.³⁸

Beginning in April 1946, representatives of the British government and the UMNO had been working together on a revised plan. Later, another working group was formed with members of the Chinese and Indian communities. The compromise plan that evolved was one for a federal organization whereby all nine states, plus Penang and Malacca, would form a Federation under a British High Commissioner.³⁹ The High Commissioner was to be assisted by Executive and Legislative Councils. These councils were to be appointed by the High Commissioner initially, but were later to be elected. The plan specified that the sixty-one member Legislative Council was to have thirty-one Malay members, whether appointed or elected - a permanent majority. The central government was to be strong with extensive powers and the states relatively weak. By the terms of this plan, however, the sultans received their sovereignty back, but were required to function under the guidance of a British Advisor, or Resident, as before. Singapore was to remain a separate Crown Colony.⁴⁰

The real issue at stake, at least in the minds of many of the Chinese, was citizenship. By the terms of the Federal plan, citizenship would be extended to all Malays, but only to those Indians and Chinese who were British subjects of the second generation born in Federal territory. Immigrants could apply for citizenship after having lived in Malaya for fifteen years, if they intended to make it their permanent home.⁴¹

The Malays opposed this plan on grounds that the citizenship

³⁸Ibid., 789. ³⁹Ibid., 790-791. Ginsburg and Roberts, 464-465.

⁴⁰Hall, 790

⁴¹Ibid.

requirements were still too lenient.

The main difficulty was that the Second World War had intensified national feeling. But the three races lived so closely intermingled that their cooperation must be assured if the ordinary amenities of life were to be preserved. Yet one of those races [the Malay] was placed in a specially privileged position.⁴²

The new constitution implementing the Federal Plan was inaugurated on 1 February 1948. The character of MCP activities underwent a series of abrupt policy changes. This may have been at least partly the result of orders from a high level Communist party meeting in Calcutta that year.⁴³ It may have also been due in part to the Federal Plan and the inferior position it afforded the Chinese.⁴⁴ Whatever the reason, the Communists adopted a militant strategy, largely withdrew from the labor union movement and other front organizations, and attempted to gain by terrorist methods what they had failed to achieve by political and economic means since 1945.⁴⁵ After February 1948, murder, arson, and terror began on a large scale in increasing intensity. In June 1948, the Malayan government declared an "Emergency" and the MCP went underground.⁴⁶

The initial goal of the MCP was to gain a region under their control, declare it an independent Communist area, and from this base extend their control over the country.⁴⁷ The MCP reorganized the MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades Association into the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). The People's Democratic Movement, the wartime Malay People's Anti-Japanese Union, was redesignated the Min Yuen, or Masses Movement, and Assigned the task of furnishing food, supplies, intelligence and

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Short, 152.

⁴⁴Hall, 791.

⁴⁵Short, 153.

⁴⁶Dougherty, 300-301.

⁴⁷Hall, 791.

recruits.⁴⁸ About one-half of the 6,000 - 7,000 former members of the MPAJA answered the MCP's call to arms. Additional recruits soon had the strength of the MRLA up to 5,000 to 6,000. The Min Yuen strength has been reliably estimated as high as 10,000 or more. In addition, there were some 500,000 Chinese squatters living on small holdings at the edge of the jungle, easily accessible to the guerrillas.⁴⁹

The MCP had been prepared when they went into the jungle in 1948. They had a goal and they had, or could get, resources. They developed a relatively simple but effective organization plan. Basic policy emanated from a Central Committee of twelve members, headed by Chin Peng, the Secretary General.⁵⁰ This Central Committee was located in the deep jungle near the Thai border.⁵¹ It passed instructions to the North and South Bureaus, which in turn passed them to the State Committees (Penang and Malacca included, for a total of eleven). State committees did the tactical planning. From the State Committees, the chain went down to District and Branch Committees, where contact with the Min Yuen was maintained. The MRLA units in the jungle received support from the Min Yuen through "Masses Executives," or contact men. In the later stages of the Emergency, the Min Yuen formed Armed Work Forces units of part-time guerrillas who assisted the MRLA with military tasks and provided a link between the Min Yuen and the MRLA.⁵²

⁴⁸Ginsburg and Roberts, 466-467.

⁴⁹Dougherty, 301-302.

⁵⁰Mans, 5.

⁵¹Richard L. Clutterbuck, "Communist Defeat in Malaya," Internal Defense Operations: A Case History: Malaya, 1948-1960 RB 31-2 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, The Command and General Staff College, 1966), p. 24.

⁵²Mans, 5.

The geography and the settlement patterns of Malaya worked both for and against the government efforts. First, the Malay Peninsula offered no contiguous sanctuaries. It has a common land border only with friendly Thailand in the north.⁵³ This border presented no significant problems. Thailand was unsympathetic with the MCPs cause, and beginning in 1949 permitted Federation police to pursue the MRLA elements (called Communist Terrorists or CTs by the British) to a depth of ten miles inside Thai territory.⁵⁴ The Royal Navy had the means to effectively patrol the coast and prevent the entry of support for the guerrillas from the sea.

Malaya is still about seventy-five percent jungle. This jungle juts up to the edge of the fifty mile wide north-south coastal strip that runs the 600 mile length of the western side of Malaya. The bulk of the populace live in this relatively narrow strip of land. The important tin mines, rubber plantations, urban centers and communication facilities all lie in this coastal strip.⁵⁵ The 500,000 Chinese squatters, mentioned above, provided a convenient source of support and served as a screen for the CT activities. This meant that the CTs had access to many of the vital areas and installations in this strip from the jungle. The one primary north-south road and the railroad run about thirty miles inland, for example, placing them in raiding distance from the jungle at many points. Eventually, an effective populace and resources control program, a productive intelligence system, superior organization and control, and an

⁵³Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 19.

⁵⁴Special Operations Research Office, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts (Washington, D.C., The American University, 1962), p. 78.

⁵⁵Ginsburg and Roberts, 52-55, 373.

offensive spirit was to turn this 600 mile jungle edge into a "killing zone" for the CTs but in the early state of the Emergency, it worked in their favor.

In organizing their efforts the British realized that the "Emergency" could quickly become a full blown civil war, with lines drawn at racial boundaries. This would wreck Malaya. Therefore, all government action to counter the threat, including the recruitment of Malays, had to minimize the fact that the MCP activities were almost solely supported by the Chinese.⁵⁶ The Chinese support worked against the MCP also, in that it made their agents more conspicuous and denied their movement the mass, "All Malayan" appeal desired. The British denied the MRLA the distinction of being recognized officially as an armed force. By referring to the MRLA as bandits or as Communist Terrorists from the outset, the British gained a psychological advantage.⁵⁷ If the British were to solve the problem in such a way as to prevent civil war and to preserve a basis in fact for a Malay Federation, " . . . it was necessary for them to drive a wedge between the Communists and the great majority of the Chinese."⁵⁸

The critical period of the Emergency was from 1948 to 1951. At the beginning of this period the CTs operated in bands from 100 to 300 strong, which permitted them to easily overrun the local police units of about ten men.⁵⁹ The gangs terrorized villagers, slashed and burned the rubber trees and destroyed mining equipment. These acts were designed to hurt the British by wrecking the economy and creating a state of anarchy.⁶⁰

⁵⁶Dougherty, 303.

⁵⁷Mans, 5.

⁵⁸Dougherty, 303. Short, 153.

⁵⁹Clutterbuck, 21.

⁶⁰Short, 153.

However, the means of livelihood for many of the populace was also being destroyed, a fact which the MCP had to eventually take into account.

The British countered on several fronts simultaneously. One of the first acts was to establish a legal basis for action against the CTs by a series of Emergency Regulations. These regulations suspended the right of Habeas Corpus and provided for the detention of persons suspected of aiding or abetting the Communists. Persons so detained could be deported. By 1949 some 6,000 Chinese had been repatriated.⁶¹ If not deported, detained persons could be held in a rehabilitation center for eight months to a year and then released.⁶² Other regulations authorized curfew to be established, required that all persons be thumb printed and issued identification cards, and required passes for workers in certain areas, such as tappers in rubber plantations. Food control regulations were promulgated specifying the quantity of food that could be on hand by a family and under what conditions it could be moved. Rice, for example, could only leave villages in an escorted convoy. These regulations were powerful weapons. The increased police strength and the judicious use of the regular forces, permitted the regulations to be rigidly enforced. They were possible because the High Commissioner, a British official, held the final authority in his hands. The basic governmental framework for establishing a single authority in control of all activities to counter the insurgent threat existed when the Emergency was declared. It had been established by the Federal Plan and the constitution inaugurated in February 1948.⁶³

⁶¹Short, 154. ⁶²Special Operations Research Office, 77.

⁶³Clutterbuck, 20, 27. Hall, 790-791.

The actions of the CTs made the requirement for physical security obvious. Police posts, plantations and mines asked for platoons of soldiers. These requests often had to be denied. There were not enough soldiers to go around. When the Emergency was declared, there were about 9,000 police trained and at their posts throughout Malaya. Eight British, Gurkha, and Malay infantry battalions were available. Under the direction of Sir Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, these policemen and soldiers, collectively referred to as security forces, were deployed to protect the installations and areas thought to be vital to the economy and livelihood of the Federation.⁶⁴ The military units were deployed in company size formations and located, when possible, so as to be able to react quickly to requests for assistance from police posts.⁶⁵ Additional police were recruited. Special Constables, a force used extensively for mine and plantation protection, were recruited and trained. Additional British police officers were brought in, including ex-Palestine policemen. Additional military units were introduced. This response drove the CTs into the jungle, but the "security forces for the most part were fighting blind."⁶⁶

During the first two years of the war [Emergency], the British relied almost exclusively on conventional military measures to put down the rebellion. But they gradually realized that the orthodox modes of warfare taught at Sandhurst were not applicable against an elusive jungle foe who was bent on protracting the conflict as long as possible.⁶⁷

The most important result of the government's employment of available military units was the breaking up of the large guerrilla bands twenty to thirty strong. This meant that even an isolated ten man

⁶⁴Short, 154.

⁶⁵Clutterbuck, 21-22.

⁶⁶Short, 154.

⁶⁷Dougherty, 302.

police outpost could expect to fare well in a clash.⁶⁸

A Jungle Training Center was established to train incoming troops in the techniques of jungle warfare that had been learned the hard way by troops in Malaya. Additional British Commonwealth military units were brought in, until there were, at peak strength, twenty-one battalions available.⁶⁹

Intelligence was a critical area. The Special Branch (intelligence) of the Federation police was made responsible for the production of intelligence. Military Intelligence Officers (MIO's) worked closely with them.⁷⁰ Agent nets and other clandestine means to obtain information were established. Large rewards were offered for information leading to the capture of CTs.⁷¹

These measures prevented the insurgents from quickly gaining control of the country and they prevented a breakdown of the economy. However, "by early 1950, the British recognized the fact that they were making little or no headway against the MRLA."⁷² In April 1950, General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed the Director of Operations for the Emergency. On 24 May 1950, he submitted his celebrated "Briggs Plan" for defeating the insurgency.⁷³

This plan had three main aims:

- (1) To bring the population, especially the isolated sections, under effective administration and protection. This included the resettlement of squatter communities.
- (2) Concurrently to expand the police and local defense forces.
- (3) To establish a unified civilian, police, and military system of command and control for all anti-terrorist operations.⁷⁴

⁶⁸Clutterbuck, 21-22.

⁶⁹Short, 153-157.

⁷⁰Mans, 7.

⁷¹Clutterbuck, 27-29.

⁷²Dougherty, 303.

⁷³Short, 155.

⁷⁴Mans, 6.

The plan also envisioned operations by regular military units freed from static security duty to eliminate CTs operating from camps deep in the jungle.

In essence, General Briggs outlined the most comprehensive and effective populace and resources control program yet implemented by any Southeast Asian government confronted with an insurgency since World War II. The plan took maximum advantage of the legal powers of the government and provided a framework for the effective use of all resources available to the government. Central to the scheme was the resettlement of the 500,000 Chinese squatters who had taken up land at the jungle's edge.⁷⁵ This resettlement was legally enforceable based on the detention regulation and also because the land the squatters lived on belonged to the Sultans of each state. The villages tended to be long, narrow and sparse, particularly in the northern portion of the Federation.⁷⁶ This precluded extensive grouping of existing villages, although some of this was done. The creation of new villages was required. From June 1950 to December 1953, some 500,000 squatters were relocated. About 600 new villages were built.⁷⁷ Concurrent with this resettlement, Home Guard units were recruited from the villages and trained by Army and police instructors. They assumed the static defensive duties, freeing the regular units for offensive operations. Later, Home Guard units were effectively employed on offensive operations against the CTs.⁷⁸

While the squatters were being relocated and the Home Guard units were being formed, General Briggs implemented a system for unifying civilian, police and military command and control of anti-terrorist

⁷⁵Short, 155.

⁷⁶Ginsburg and Roberts, 80-86, 99, 377.

⁷⁷Dougherty, 303.

⁷⁸Mans, 6.

operations, the third point of his plan. This was done by establishing a War Council at the Federal level, and War Executive Committees at state level. The War Council was headed by the Director of Operations and included the heads of the police, army, air force, navy and the separate heads of the civil administration. At state and district level, the War Executive Councils were headed by the senior civil officer (e.g., District Officer). The full committee would typically include the local military commander, Police Chief, Special Branch Officer, Information Officer, Home Guard Officer and other officials as required. In addition, unofficial members were sometimes included. These were carefully selected members of the local communities. By means of these committees, information could be exchanged, plans coordinated and control centralized. The military commander retained full command of his troops, and the police chief retained control of his policemen, but their efforts were made easier to coordinate. The full committee met once weekly, but the Operations Sub-Committee, consisting of the senior civil officer, the Police Chief and the military commander, met daily. The police and military ran a joint operations room to facilitate routine coordination and control.⁷⁹

The Briggs Plan was well underway when in October 1951 the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, was ambushed and killed.⁸⁰ Terrorist attacks had been particularly effective in the period immediately preceding the High Commissioner's death. Civilian morale was at its lowest point. In February 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed as both High Commissioner and Director of Operations. "He amalgamated the Federal Executive Council with the War Council, stating at the time: 'there can

⁷⁹Ibid., 6-7.

⁸⁰Short, 157.

be but one instrument of policy at Federation level."⁸¹ He adopted the Briggs Plan and pushed its execution with new vigor and determination.

As one author has said:

There is no denying the drive, indeed the ruthlessness, which Templer brought to his job as supreme commander. Civil servants were shaken out of their routine, the European business community were [sic] indicted for complacency and racialism, the inefficient were dismissed.⁸²

The resettlement portion of the Briggs Plan was critical to the success of the anti-terrorist campaign. As the squatters were moved back from the jungle edge, the insurgents became exposed. Their supply lines lengthened, and were more easily severed. The plan forced the bandit or his supporter to cross the open areas where they were vulnerable to ambush and capture. Enforcement of the curfew, food control and pass and identification card regulations could be intensified as a result of the resettlement. This weakened the Min Yuen's ability to supply the MRLA.⁸³

There were, however, problems connected with the resettlement. The British solved the land problem, one that may have been the most difficult to solve elsewhere, by persuading the sultans to provide the land free or on long term lease to the squatters. There was no time to carve space out of the virgin jungle. Settlers were reluctant to leave livestock, crops and homes. The government provided market price compensation for crops and livestock that were abandoned, and sold building materials for the new home at cost. An initial grant of money was made to each new settler to assist him begin his new life.⁸⁴ In addition there were problems connected with the settler's accessibility to his

⁸¹Mans, 7.

⁸²Short, 157.

⁸³Dougherty, 304-305.

⁸⁴Neil B. Mills, "Civic Action in Malaya," Internal Defense Operations: A Case History; Malaya, 1948-1960. RB 31-2 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The Command and General Staff College, 1966), pp. 47-48.

work. This was particularly true for those who had lived scattered about mining property where they worked and for those tappers who had lived at the edge of rubber plantations. Some of these people found new employment; for others it became an inconvenience for the duration of the Emergency.⁸⁵ Problems such as these will be evident in any large scale displacement of people, even for short distances. The real potential problems of a legal basis for the action, adequate land for the resettlement, the resources to develop the new villages and the military and police strength to furnish reasonable protection were met and solved by the British authorities.⁸⁶

Special Branch personnel established contacts and developed agent nets in the new villages. Intelligence grew as the people became convinced of their safety from reprisals by the terrorists. The CTs were driven farther back into the jungle where they attempted to cultivate enough land to feed themselves. Deep penetration patrol units and special units operating with the aborigines deep in the jungle sought out and killed the terrorists, destroyed their crops and kept them moving.⁸⁷

Behind this screen of offensive operations in depth, significant changes in the lives of the resettled squatters were being made.⁸⁸ The new villages were administered initially by a trained civil service man. Where possible, the administrators were of Chinese origin. In time, the villagers were permitted some degree of self-government.⁸⁹ The new villages provided a higher standard of living. Electricity, sewage systems

⁸⁵Ginsburg and Roberts, 99-102.

⁸⁶Ibid. Mills, 47.

⁸⁷Dougherty, 305-306. Short, 158-159. Clutterbuck, 27-31.

⁸⁸Dougherty, 303-304. Ginsburg and Roberts, 99-102.

⁸⁹Mills, 47.

and running water was provided in most. Education was made available to both children and adults. The question of land tenure was dealt with and the squatters, "the poorest ten percent of the population," had long term leases or titles to the land for the first time in their lives. These measures were designed to integrate these Chinese into the mainstream of Malayan life, a factor of extreme importance to the future of the Federation.⁹⁰

The CTs recognized the impact the resettlement plan would have on their activities and opposed it. Terror, murder, and arson were used to intimidate the people, to keep them from leaving the jungle edge or to encourage them to continue to act as agents in the new village.⁹¹ The MCP changed these policies in October 1951 because it became clear that they were costing the party support it might otherwise have. The party therefore prohibited the following actions:

Seizing identity and ration cards, burning new villages, attacking post offices, reservoirs and other public facilities, derailing civilian trains, burning religious buildings and Red Cross vehicles, and committing sabotage against the major industries, thereby causing workers to lose their jobs.⁹²

However, there was no prohibition against killing "British and Gurkha troops, senior civil servants and police officers . . . but not British health officers and engineers."⁹³

The coordinated attack on the MCP made possible by the Briggs Plan had its effect. General Templer left Malaya at the end of 1954. During his tenure the Briggs Plan had been fully implemented. Contrasted

⁹⁰Dougherty 303-304. Ginsburg and Roberts, 99-102, 457.

⁹¹Mans, 6. Clutterbuck, 27. ⁹²Dougherty, 304-305.

⁹³Ibid.

to the pessimism that pervaded when he arrived in Malaya, it was obvious when he left that the war was being won.⁹⁴

In 1953, the recognized political parties of Malaya met. An Elections Committee was appointed to select candidates nominated by the parties. In 1955, the first elections were held in Malaya at the Federation level.⁹⁵ In the same year the Malayan government offered a general amnesty to all persons who had individually taken arms against the government. A formal agreement was signed on September 9, 1955 with MCP leaders. This agreement was about the same as the surrender policy already in effect.⁹⁶ This offer eventually resulted in a meeting in December 1955 between Chin Peng, the MCP Security General, and the principal members of the Malayan and Singapore governments. Chin Peng wanted to have the MCP "lay down" their arms (but not surrender them) in exchange for recognition of the MCP as a legal political party. These terms were not accepted by the government representatives.⁹⁷ The MCP then issued this statement:

As soon as the elected government of the Federation attains control of internal security and local armed forces we will end the hostilities, lay down our arms and disband our forces.⁹⁸

Chin Peng obviously did not believe that the British would grant independence to the Federation and implied that he would continue to struggle for Malayan independence. By the end of 1956, the MRLA and its associated elements had lost "5,933 killed, 1,752 surrendered, and 1,173 captured [since the beginning of the Emergency.] Ninety per cent of these casualties were Chinese."⁹⁹ The number of public incidents had dropped

⁹⁴Short, 157-158. ⁹⁵Ginsburg and Roberts, 455-475.

⁹⁶Dougherty, 307. ⁹⁷Short, 159. ⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Special Operations Research Office, 79.

from over 200 per week in 1951 to less than twenty.

In the jungle . . . their organization was disrupted by increasing attacks . . . and they had succeeded neither in disrupting the economy nor in subverting the major political problems that were emerging in Malaya.¹⁰⁰

On August 31, 1957 the Federation of Malaya was granted independence in the British Commonwealth.¹⁰¹ This removed the MCP party's claim that it was fighting for the liberation of the Federation for Britain. The new government then made a final amnesty offer to the remaining guerrillas, about 2,000 strong. By the terms of the offer, CTs surrendering were guaranteed protection from prosecution for acts against the government prior to independence. "Those desiring 'repatriation' to China were promised free passage."¹⁰² Again, these terms were about the same as those already in effect. There were large scale surrenders in 1959, with CTs lured in partly in response to the large rewards offered.¹⁰³

The Emergency was officially ended in July 1960, with Chin Peng and about 400 die-hard followers still at large along the jungled border of Malaya and Thailand.¹⁰⁴

Malaya stands out in any study of counter-insurgency or internal defense as a success. It has, in the minds of many, become the model for internal defense operations. There are many lessons to be learned and retained from a study of the Malayan Emergency. However, several important points must be kept in mind when attempting to apply these lessons elsewhere. These are:

1. Although decisions were influenced, no doubt, by the anticipated reaction of the populace, the British had full constitutional authority to govern the country and fight the

¹⁰⁰Short, 159-160.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Dougherty, 309.

¹⁰³Short, 160

¹⁰⁴Clutterbuck, 31.

[constitutional authority to govern the country and fight] the insurgency as deemed best.

2. The fact that the insurgents were almost entirely Chinese made them easier to identify, control and eliminate. The disadvantages of this situation were primarily long range, and in the immediacy of the counter-terrorist activities, it was a distinct advantage.
 3. The geography of Malaya facilitated its isolation from outside support.
 4. Although hindered by labor strikes, Britain had restored the Malayan economy to approximately its pre-World War II level by the time the Emergency was declared.
 5. The size of the MRLA proper did not exceed 7,000 persons.
- Significant lessons from the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960

are:

1. The government established a legal basis for the actions necessary to counter the insurgency early in the operation. This was especially important in the area of populace and resources control.
2. Responsibility and authority for the conduct of all counter-terrorist operations were centralized in a single authority at Federation level. The machinery for the coordination of civil, police and military actions was established at every level and used.
3. Populace and resources control measures were emphasized and coordinated with other police, civil and military actions. The terrorists were dependent on support from the populace.

Resettlement, curfew, food control, pass and identification cards and the powers of detention and deportation were used extensively to sever the guerrilla from his support.

4. The populace and resources control measures of resettlement provided the means for beginning the integration of the poorest element of the Malayan society into the mainstream of the national life. Thus, it was a long range measure to alleviate conditions that could lead to a future insurgent movement. The resettlement program was closely coordinated with intelligence activities and psychological operations.
5. Intelligence was emphasized early and coordinated at every level of operations. Intelligence operations were assisted by the early establishment of Emergency regulations.
6. Offensive operations were emphasized.
7. Locally available man power was recruited and trained as policemen, Special Constabulary personnel and Home Guards, freeing the regular military personnel for offensive operations.

CHAPTER III

INSURGENCY IN VIETNAM

In the author's foreword to her book, The Struggle for Indochina, Dr. Ellen J. Hammer states that: "Coming from an academic environment imbued with respect for the printed word, I have reluctantly had to recognize in the course of preparing this book how inadequate, inaccurate and often untrue the printed word has been in regard to Indochina and its people."¹ Dr. Hammer wrote these words on March 30, 1954. They could well have been written today.

The current Vietnamese conflict, the Second Indochina War, as the late Dr. Bernard B. Fall has called it, is a conflict to which the United States has committed her prestige, a significant amount of treasure and the greater loss represented by growing casualty lists.² The conflict is infinitely complex. There has been an almost uninterrupted period of violence since 1946.³ The dynamic immediacy of the situation does not always permit a view of daily events sufficiently clear to discern cause and effect relationships. Perhaps this is part of what Dr. Hammer wrote of in 1954. What does seem clear is that to understand the

¹Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 1.

²Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 27-396.

³Ibid., 19-20.

struggle taking place today in South Vietnam, the observer must have some understanding of Vietnamese history, the impact of French Colonialism in the area, and of events since World War II.

French influence in Southeast Asia prior to 1843 was primarily through the French Catholic missionaries. Compared with the Spanish in the Philippines, even this type of contact was late. The first permanent French Catholic mission was not established in Vietnam until early in the 17th century. One French missionary who first went to Vietnam in 1627, Monsignor Alexandre de Rhodes, unified the transcriptions of the Vietnamese language made by his predecessors and produced the Latinized Vietnamese alphabet still in use. This device greatly facilitated the introduction of Western culture.⁴

In 1777, the ruling Annamese Court of Hue was toppled by an uprising known as the Tay-Son rebellion. A French missionary, Georges Pigneau, met the escaping prince of the royal family, Nguyen Anh, and assisted him over a period of more than twenty years in his effort to regain the throne.⁵ Pigneau died in 1799, and in 1801 Nguyen Anh defeated the last of the Tay-Son rebels and proclaimed himself emperor under the name of Gia-Long. "The Chinese emperor confirmed Gia-Long in his title by sending him a new tributary seal in 1802, and Gia-Long gave the country he ruled its present name, Viet-Nam."⁶

The Vietnamese Empire was ruled from Hue, and consisted of three parts: (1) Annam, or Central Vietnam; (2) Tongking (Tonkin), an Annamese protectorate of densely populated rice producing river valleys to the

⁴D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1964), p. 394-395.

⁵Ibid., 404-409.

⁶Fall, 21.

north; and (3) the area to the south, known to the West as Cochin China. Portions of this southern area had been settled by the Vietnamese as late as 1757.⁷

It had taken the Vietnamese about 1000 years to occupy the territory over which Gia-Long proclaimed himself Emperor. They had destroyed and largely assimilated the ancient Champa Kingdom of the Chams and, more recently, had taken lands along the Mekong River from the Khmers (Cambodians).⁸ The Vietnamese march to the south was marked by "military conquests over states whose level of indigenous culture was at least equal, if not superior, to its own. . . . Its action was simply a manifestation of the vitality of its peoples. It was simply and purely a process of colonial conquests for material gains, no more, no less."⁹

The French tried without success to obtain commercial rights and to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Annamese court from 1800 to 1843. During the period 1825 to 1831, for example, three separate French requests to establish commercial enterprises in Vietnam were denied by Hue.¹⁰ The entire situation in the Far East was changed by the British defeat of the Chinese in 1841 and the opening up of China to Western trade. After this development, France adopted a harder line toward Hue.¹¹

After the death of Gia-Long in 1820 the Vietnamese severely persecuted the Christians in the country. The French took no action to halt this persecution, even though some of those persecuted were French missionaries. In 1843, and again in 1845, French warships sailed into the Annamese port of Tourane (Da Nang) and secured the release of French

⁷Hall, 409.

⁸Ibid., 173-187.

⁹Fall, 15.

¹⁰Hall, 608-609.

¹¹Ibid.

priests held in custody there. Further persecution of French priests in 1856 and 1857 brought stiff protests from the French. The Annamese Emperor remained obdurate. He would not receive a French consul, would make no guarantees for the safety of Christians in his empire, and refused the French commercial rights in his territory.¹²

The immediate French answer to these refusals was an indecisive attack on Tourane in 1858. The expedition was shifted to the Saigon area, where greater success was met. In May 1862, following marked French success in Cochin China, the Emperor Tu-Duc asked for terms. He ceded to France three eastern provinces of Cochin China, agreed to pay a heavy indemnity in installments over ten years, and promised the free exercise of Catholicism in his dominions. In addition, three ports, including Tourane, were opened to French trade.¹³

In 1863, the French established a protectorate over the kingdom of Cambodia, and in 1866 occupied three western provinces of Cochin China. This toehold in Southeast Asia was important to the French primarily because the Mekong River was believed to be navigable into China and, hence, a new source of trade. This proved to be untrue, but an exploration party discovered that the Red River, in Tongking, was an excellent passageway into southern China. French interest shifted north.¹⁴

Tongking was overrun with pirates and insurgents in the early 1870's, and the Vietnamese Emperor, Tu-Duc, did not have the means to cope with the problem. He appealed to China for help. When the regular Chinese soldiers arrived, they too became bandits.

French colonial expansionism in Asia was reduced as a result of

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., 609-613.

¹⁴Ibid., 618-619.

their recent defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, and the attention being given French interests in Mexico at this time.¹⁵ The Governor in Saigon sent a small force north to evict Dupuis. The commander of the force, "the impulsive Francois Garnier," attempted to negotiate with the local mandarins, found them unresponsive, and promptly seized the defenses of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Ninh Binh. He soon controlled the administration of lower Tongking. The governor in Saigon sent an envoy north to settle the matter with the Court of Hue in 1874. By the terms of the agreement he reached, Tu-Duc, still emperor, recognized French sovereignty over Cochin China, opened Hanoi to French trade, granted the French free navigation of the Red River into China, agreed to receive a French Resident in Hue and a French consul in Hanoi, and again promised freedom to Christians.¹⁶

In 1882, on the pretext that Tongking bandits (referred to as the "Black Flags" by the French) prevented their use of the Red River, the French sent a strong expeditionary force into Tongking, to seize that area, and to firmly establish control over the Court of Hue. This operation was eventually successful. Tu-Duc died in 1883 and the French extracted the following terms from his successor: (1) Vietnam recognized her status as a French protectorate and granted France control over all external affairs; (2) French Residents with suitable garrisons were to be sent to all important cities and towns with jurisdiction over "all Vietnamese authorities everywhere"; (3) all Annamite troops were to be recalled from Tongking and the French were granted authority to occupy military posts anywhere in the empire; (4) Vietnam ceded an Annamese province bordering on Cochin China to France, as well as her war ships;

¹⁵Fall, 23-24.

¹⁶Hall, 621-622.

(5) Vietnam further agreed to place the customs service under French administration, until an indemnity to cover the cost of the French occupation had been paid. The harsh terms of this treaty were modified by a later treaty in 1884, which restored the province ceded to the French in the south and redefined the limits of Tongking to Annam's benefit. The basic relationships established by the earlier treaty, however, remained in effect.¹⁷

In the meantime, the French had been tightening their hold on Cambodia and Cochin China. In the period 1884 to 1886 there were rebellions in both Cambodia and Cochin China and it was 1895 before the French were able to wrest physical control of Tongking from the "Black Flags."¹⁸

Nevertheless, in 1887 the French issued a number of decrees to place into effect the administrative procedures for governing the area. Cochin China, Annam, Tongking, and Cambodia were brought together to form the Union of Indochina, headed by a civilian governor-general, who reported to the Minister of Marine and Colonies in Paris. A Resident-General was appointed to Cambodia, who could administer the country as he saw fit, and ignore the Cambodian assembly of ministers if he chose. The king retained only his court ceremony and personal prerogatives. A Resident-General was appointed to both Annam and Tongking. Cochin-China, the only outright colony, was administered by a Lieutenant-Governor. Each unit had a separate organization and budget. Laos was added by treaties with Siam in 1893 and 1904. Indochina was born, but "everywhere indeed in the French empire unrest and rebellion were constant factors

¹⁷Hall, 624-627.

¹⁸Ibid., 628.

for many years."¹⁹

French colonial rule in Indochina followed the consolidation of her control over the area. The Court of Hue continued to exist, but as a facade only. The emperor and his cabinet had little real power. "Every one of their acts, except those dealing with such minor religious matters as setting the exact dates of movable holidays, required the signature of the *résident supérieur*."²⁰ The governor of the Colony of Cochin China administered his area through province chiefs who were officials of the French Indochinese Civil Service. The Resident-General of Annam and Tongking maintained the myth of the protectorate status of the areas, dealing with French Advisors to the mandarins who theoretically headed each province. In reality, the residents held full powers, including those of the police and, often, the judiciary.²¹

The French Civil Service permitted, after 1927, capable Vietnamese to rise to executive posts in Indochina. Some held important positions in Cambodia and Laos. On the other hand, the European colonial population competed with the Vietnamese for even the most menial jobs. There was a closeness, a familiarity, between the French colonials and the native population that was not found in any other colony of Southeast Asia. The competition of the lower class European colonials with the Vietnamese for the more menial jobs hindered the growth of a Vietnamese middle class and created bitter animosity between the two groups. "If familiarity ever bred contempt, Indochina was probably the one area in the Far East in which the local population had become thoroughly familiar with its colonial overlords."²²

¹⁹Ibid., 628-629, 658-664.

²¹Ibid.

²⁰Fall, 32.

²²Ibid., 36.

There was no effective system for the Vietnamese to express their views to the colonial administration. "The bulk of the legislation for Indo-China was enacted by the French parliament or took the form of decrees issued by the Ministry of Colonies."²³ In November, 1928, the Grand Council of Financial and Economic Interests was created.²⁴ This was an Indochina-wide organization that included high ranking French and Indochinese officials. The Governor General was required to consult the Grand Council before approving any of the Indochinese budgets, but the Council was purely advisory and could consider only those matters presented to it by the Governor General.²⁵ The Council tended to be dominated by the large economic interests in Indochina, such as the Bank of Indochina. The native voice on the council was correspondingly small.²⁶ There was little real effort to develop a capacity for self-government in the Vietnamese.

The aim of French education in Indochina was initially to produce interpreters, but this gradually broadened and educational concepts were encompassed in the wider frame of the policy of cultural assimilation. The goal of this broader policy was to make loyal Frenchmen of the Vietnamese by inculcating larger volumes of French culture into the native society. Accordingly, the University of Hanoi was opened in 1907, and a formal system established to make higher education available to selected students. This policy of assimilation, however, "had strangely different results from those it was intended to produce. It has been said that the bitterest opponents of the French were those who knew the language best."²⁷ The liberal arts education provided by the French fanned the fires of

²³Hall, 714.

²⁶Fall, 39.

²⁴Fall, 34-35.

²⁵Hall, 715.

²⁷Hall, 717.

nationalism more than it drew the educated to the French banner. The nationalist feeling grew so strong in the student body that the University of Hanoi was closed in 1909 and remained closed for approximately nine years. The French rounded up the leaders of this movement and imprisoned them on Poulo Condore Island, off the coast of Cochin China, and thereby broke up the first serious nationalist movement of the twentieth century.²⁸

During World War I, France drafted 100,000 Vietnamese for combat duty in Europe. These men brought back to Vietnam undoubtedly a broader view of their status than they had had previously. After the war, during the second administration of the liberal Governor General Albert Sarraut, some of the political prisoners were released from Poulo Condore. There was a rise of political parties.²⁹ In keeping with the tradition of small, clandestine organizations, an extremely large number of parties appeared, some only briefly.³⁰

Three clusters of them emerged during the 1920's and 1930's: the reformists, who favored collaboration with the French, sought greater freedom and eventual self-determination within the [French] community, and were strongest in the South Cochin China; the militants, both Communists and non-Communists, who opposed the French and favored some degree of open warfare; and those opposed to both collaboration and open revolution, who counseled working obliquely - often with or through the Japanese.³¹

Those in the first group formed the Constitutionalist Party in 1923, the first legal political party in the country. It was made up of "government officials, intellectuals and wealthy landowners; its existence was inconclusive."³²

²⁸Ibid., 718.

²⁹Ibid., 719.

³⁰Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 2-17.

³¹Ibid., 17.

³²Ibid., 18.

The earliest important militant party was the Vietnamese Nationalist (or People's) Party (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang), or VNQDD, founded in Hanoi in 1927. This party had strong Kuomintang leanings and was supported by students, "civic servants, small businessmen, tradesmen and company grade officers in the armed forces."³³ The primary impact of this party was the Yen-Bay Rebellion that began on February 10, 1930 with a revolt by Vietnamese troops against their French officers in the garrison of Yen-Bay, north of Hanoi. The soldiers who had mutinied soon returned to their barracks but a whole wave of demonstrations swept the area, particularly in Tongking.³⁴ French reprisals were harsh, indiscriminate and, temporarily at least, successful. The VNQDD was virtually destroyed. It fragmented and some of the leadership went to Nationalist China, to return with them later to Tongking.³⁵

The Communists were the other major party of the militant group. The growth and eventual strength of this party was due largely to one man, Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot), better known by the name he assumed later in life, Ho Chi Minh. He left Vietnam when he was a young man and travelled to England, France and other European countries. He became a member of the French Socialist Party and was among those who broke away from this group to found the French Communist Party. In 1923, Ho went to Moscow as a delegate to the Congress of the Peasant International. In 1925 he was in Canton, employed as a translator in the Russian consulate.³⁶ While in Canton, Ho formed the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi, the Association of Vietnamese Revolutionary Young

³³Ibid., 19-20.

³⁴Ibid., 20.

³⁵Hammer, 84-86.

³⁶Ibid., 74-80.

Comrades, better known as the Revolutionary Youth Association (RYA).³⁷ Through the RYA, about 250 Vietnamese youth went to Canton and studied revolutionary techniques. Of this number, about 200 returned to Vietnam.³⁸

In 1929, the RYA held a congress in Hong Kong, where the headquarters had moved after the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927 had forced them to move. Representatives from the three sections of Vietnam, from members of the movement in China and from other parts of Asia assembled. A proposal was made by three delegates from Tongking to change the name of the party to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). This proposal was voted down because Ho Chi Minh had emphasized a "revolutionary nationalist party with socialist tendencies."³⁹ Ho had preached the need for a two stage revolution in Indochina. The first step was to be a nationalist movement to oust the French, and the second phase, to establish a Communist system, would take place later. The adherents to Ho's philosophy defeated the proposal, and the three delegates walked out of the congress, returned to Hanoi, and established their own Communist party. Lai Duc Thu, who headed the RYA at this time, also established a Communist party in Annam. The situation became unmanageable in the Comintern's view when a third Communist party, the Communist Union, was formed. Ho Chi Minh was recalled from Bangkok where he was "pamphleteering," to merge the three groups. He moved the headquarters from Hong Kong to Haiphong and later to Saigon. By June 6, 1931 Ho had accomplished the merger; the new party was known as the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). One of Ho Chi Minh's greatest contributions was to build the pyramidal organization that ran from village committees to

³⁷Pike, 21.

³⁸Hammer, 80.

³⁹Ibid., 81.

the central committee at the top. This had been started earlier by graduates of the RYA training program. These village organizations established by the RYA were to prove to be the only basis for a government other than the one dominated by the French. It was from this pyramidal base that the future organizations of Ho Chi Minh were to draw their strength. "At the same time, Ho Chi Minh molded the organizational structure into a network of affiliated groups and associations of farmers, women, and workers, and also created the Anti-Imperialist League and a branch of the International Red Aid Association."⁴⁰ Ho Chi Minh was arrested by the British in Hong Kong in June, 1931 and imprisoned.

The major accomplishment of the ICP in the 1930's was remaining a viable organization when the French were able to crush so many other militant groups. "This was chiefly due to their skillful organization building and their general conservatism in policies and programs."⁴¹

The major pro-Japanese groups were the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, both militant religious sects and both in Cochinchina. These sects, along with several Dai Viet (Greater Vietnam) organizations became important after Japan actually occupied the country.⁴²

In 1932 the Emperor Bao Dai returned from France where he had been educated. In 1933 he appointed Ngo Dinh Diem, "already widely respected for his honesty and ability," to his cabinet.⁴³ In the same year, however, the French took measures to further reduce the functions of the Emperor's Cabinet. The French would not discuss a Diem proposal to establish a deliberative assembly and "at the same time, took measures

⁴⁰Pike, 22.

⁴¹Ibid., 24.

⁴²Ibid., 25.

⁴³Hammer, 86.

which had the effect of further separating Tongking from Annam."⁴⁴ The French had abolished the position of Prime Minister in the Emperor's Cabinet earlier and had authorized the French Resident to assume the duties of Prime Minister, including presiding over and participating in all Cabinet meetings. "Dien resigned rather than accept subservience to France."⁴⁵ Nationalism was a concept, a dynamic force, that the French would make no concessions to. As "Ho Chi Minh liked to point out, . . . liberty, equality, and fraternity, although real enough in France, apparently were not for export."⁴⁶

In 1936 a new Governor General, Brevie, was appointed to Indochina by the Popular Front government of France. He permitted political parties and their newspapers to openly operate in Cochin China and relaxed the tight reign held on the still-banned ICP in Tongking. An "Indochinese Democratic Front" was allowed to operate and publish its own newspaper. One of the leaders of this front was Vo Nguyen Giap. Soon, eight openly pro-Communist newspapers were being published. Brevie simplified the procedure by which Vietnamese could acquire French citizenship and modified the tax base to the benefit of the poorer people.⁴⁷

In other words, in French-ruled Viet-Nam there had been notable strides between 1936 and 1939 in the field of political activities. Unfortunately, the absence of a concerted colonial policy in Paris . . . made any far-reaching arrangements between French interests and Vietnamese nationalism almost impossible.⁴⁸

In September 1939, the Communist Party, outlawed in France and in Indochina, went underground.⁴⁹

The Vichy government of France, after signing an armistice with Nazi Germany on June 25, 1940, signed an agreement with Japan on

⁴⁴Ibid., 86-87

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid., 75

⁴⁷Fall, 38.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., 39

August 30, recognizing "Japan's 'pre-eminent' position in the Far East and granted the Japanese in principle certain transit facilities in Tongking, subject to agreement between the military authorities on the spot."⁵⁰ While negotiations were taking place in Hanoi between Japanese and French military authorities to determine what the agreement would be, the Japanese attacked two French posts on the Tongking-Chinese border. The French were quickly defeated and an agreement was signed permitting the Japanese access to Indochina with certain restrictions. By July 29, 1941, the Vichy government had made other agreements with Japan that effectively removed all restrictions on Japanese use of facilities in Indochina.

The Vichy government appointed "tough and able Admiral Jean Decoux" as Governor General of Indochina. Decoux maintained at least the semblance of French authority. Under his administration, which has been described as being "anti-Semitic, anti-Masonic, anti-Gaullist, and pro-Axis," a number of reforms were instituted. Public works were developed and completed at a faster rate than before the war. In 1942, Decoux abolished salary differences between Vietnamese and European civil servants, and in 1943 the Vietnamese gained a majority in the Federal Council, Decoux' new term for the Grand Council. Decoux, however, ruled with completely dictatorial powers in the shadow of the Japanese. Only two significant uprisings occurred prior to December 1944. Both occurred in 1940, one in Tongking and one near Saigon. Both were crushed by Decoux' forces.⁵¹

While Decoux was ruling Vietnam for the Japanese, the ICP worked to broaden the base for its support. A new front was proclaimed on

⁵⁰Ibid., 43.

⁵¹Ibid., 42, 48-49.

May 19, 1941: the Viet-Nam Doc-Lap Dong Minh Hoi, or the Revolutionary League for the Independence of Vietnam, referred to as the Viet Minh. Ho Chi Minh was elected Secretary General.⁵² The majority of the Viet Minh activity was moved to southern China. Numerous other Vietnamese nationalist groups were also using this refuge, to include the old VNQDD. In 1941, the Kuomintang in China arrested some of the Communist leaders of the Viet Minh to "give the leadership more balance."⁵³ Ho Chi Minh was among those arrested, and in 1942, the Chinese Nationalists forged a nominal coalition of all the major Vietnamese nationalist movements seeking refuge in China. The result was the Dong Minh Hoi. The Allies found, however, that the Dong Minh Hoi, except for the Viet Minh, was an ineffective organization. The Viet Minh participated with the Dong Minh Hoi enough to draw a stipend from the Chinese Nationalist government, but maintained a separate, and the only effective, network of cells throughout Vietnam, which it had inherited from the Communist Party and its affiliates.⁵⁴ In 1943, Ho Chi Minh was released from jail by the Chinese to once again head the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh established friendly relations with the Americans in China, who supplied them with arms and provided personnel to work with them to rescue downed American fliers and to furnish intelligence on Japanese movements and actions. On March 28, 1944, a "Provisional Republican Government of Vietnam" was organized by the Chinese. The Viet Minh had a minority role in this government-in-exile, and sent most of its units clandestinely into the jungles along the northern border of Vietnam. In late 1944, Ho Chi Minh himself went across the border. "The Viet Minh did not waste its men on

⁵²Ibid., 62-63.

⁵³Hammer, 96.

⁵⁴Ibid.

any major actions against the Japanese but concentrated on organizing and extending its strength in the Vietnamese countries."⁵⁵ The Viet Minh had an Army of some 10,000 trained men under Vo Nguyen Giap in Northern Tongking.⁵⁶

On March 9, 1945, the Japanese seized control of Indochina from the French. Many Frenchmen were killed and others were placed in jails and concentration camps. Some were able to escape into China. On March 10, the Japanese announced the end of the colonial status of Indochina. On March 11, 1945, Bao Dai, the figurehead Emperor under the French, announced the independence of Annam and Tongking, uniting the two areas. Laos and Cambodia proclaimed their independence. The French hold on Indochina was broken.⁵⁷

In August 1945, the Viet Minh decided to seize power from the Bao Dai government. By 25 August, Bao Dai had surrendered the government to the Viet Minh's People's National Liberation Committee, headed by Ho Chi Minh. The Viet Minh also formed a Committee of the South to rule Cochinchina, which the Japanese had joined to Annam and Tongking under Bao Dai before his abdication to the Viet Minh. Thus, all of Vietnam was, theoretically at least, under Viet Minh control. On September 2, 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed in Hanoi by the Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh.⁵⁸

During the war the Free French had debated the status of the colonies after Japan was defeated. In March 1945, the French Provisional Government issued a declaration on Indochina that provided for: (1) a Federal Indochina within a French Union; (2) French citizenship for Indochinese nationals; (3) control of foreign affairs and defense matters

⁵⁵Hammer, 97.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., 41.

⁵⁸Ibid., 100-110.

by France, but with Federation armed forces; (4) freedom of thought, religion, press and association; (5) industrialization in the colonies; (6) an elected Federal legislative assembly, but with provisions for broad French powers to determine the method of election; and (7) an appointed High Commissioner, instead of a Governor General, who would rule with an appointed cabinet.⁵⁹ This declaration represented a major change in French policy. The changes proposed were at least ten years too late.

Movement of the French back into Indochina after World War II was complicated by many factors, not the least of which was Ho Chi Minh's new government-in-being in Hanoi. In addition, the Allies decided that the Nationalist Chinese should occupy Vietnam north of the sixteenth parallel to disarm the Japanese and free Allied prisoners. The British were to do the same south of that line. French forces did not have the ships, the men or the supplies to accomplish the task. In the south, the British under General Douglas D. Gracey, actively assisted the French in regaining control of key areas within Cochin China.⁶⁰ The French effectively reestablished full control of Cambodia with British assistance. General Gracey went considerably beyond his strict orders to only engage in disarming the Japanese and freeing Allied prisoners. He recognized that he was doing so, but "took it upon himself to restore Indochina south of the sixteenth parallel to the French."⁶¹ On September 23, 1945, General Le Clerc returned to Saigon as the French Commander in Chief. On October 25, with British assistance, he began an operation to restore French control over all of Cochin China. He expected the operation to last one month.⁶²

⁵⁹Ibid., 111-112.

⁶⁰Ibid., 106-115.

⁶¹Ibid., 115.

⁶²Ibid., 119-120. Pike, 28.

General Le Clerc had serious problems trying to get into North Vietnam to relieve the Chinese there. The 185,000 Chinese greatly outnumbered the French, so that a forced entry was out of the question.⁶³

The problem facing the French then, was to negotiate a withdrawal of Chinese troops and come to terms with the Ho Chi Minh to permit French entry into Tongking. These negotiations were somewhat hampered by the High Commissioner of Indochina, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, whose appointment has been called France's "major postwar blunder in Southeast Asia He had neither the patience nor the tact for negotiating with 'natives'."⁶⁴

Admiral d'Argenlieu left for France in December 1945, leaving Le Clerc in power. On February 28, 1946, French negotiators, at Le Clerc's direction, reached an agreement with China whereby the Chinese troops would be withdrawn from North Vietnam by March 31, 1946 in exchange for the French renouncing their prewar special rights in China. China was also granted the right to use the Yunnan railway and the port of Haiphong. French troop ships arrived in Hanoi from Saigon on March 6. On that same day, Le Clerc's negotiators signed an agreement with Ho Chi Minh in which France recognized the Republic of Viet-Nam as a Free State having its own government, parliament, army, and treasury, and belonging to the Indochinese Federation and the French Union. Further agreements set the size of French forces north of the sixteenth parallel at 15,000 and established the location of their bases. France was to withdraw this force over a period of five years and train and equip the Viet-Minh forces.⁶⁵ This agreement went considerably beyond the

⁶³Hammer, 152.

⁶⁴Fall, 72.

⁶⁵Ibid., 72-73.

March 24, 1945 declaration of the Provisional French Government. It was held in contempt by d'Argenlieu upon his return from France. Further, on May 30, 1946, d'Argenlieu "recognized the Republic of Cochinchina as a 'free state' . . . , in exactly the same terms as the Republic of Vietnam had been recognized on March 6!"⁶⁶ This took place while Ho Chi Minh and his chief ministers were in Fontainebleau at a conference to determine what the status of all Indochina would be. In July, General Le Clerc asked for transfer from Indochina. He did not agree with d'Argenlieu's insistence on ignoring the political reality of the Viet Minh power.⁶⁷

Ho Chi Minh returned from France in September 1946 with the March 6 accords confirmed. Further negotiations were scheduled for January 1947. However, there were still armed clashes between the French and the Viet Minh, both north and south of the sixteenth parallel. In October 1946 the French people adopted a constitution that omitted any mention of fully independent states in the French Union. In November, the Viet Minh countered with a constitution that did not mention the French Union. In November a series of clashes between the French and the Vietnamese led General Valluy, Le Clerc's replacement, to order that the Viet Minh be given a "hard lesson."⁶⁸ Viet Minh had occupied the Chinese quarter of Haiphong. The French demanded that they vacate the area. The Viet Minh refused and French troops were sent in to evict them. When the shooting started, Vietnamese civilians began evacuating Haiphong toward a French air base. The French apparently mistook them for Viet Minh and fired on them with naval guns. Some 6,000 Vietnamese, mostly civilians, were killed. Relations continued to worsen and on December 19, 1946, there

⁶⁶Fall, 73.

⁶⁷Hammer, 156-168.

⁶⁸Ibid., 74-76.

was a general uprising.⁶⁹ The "First Indochina War" had begun.

While bargaining with the French in 1945 and 1946, the Viet Minh had successfully eliminated or gained control of all other nationalist organizations north of the 16th parallel. The VNQDĐ had returned to Vietnam with the Chinese occupation troops in September 1945. By July 1946, Vo Nguyen Giap, the Viet Minh military commander, had arrested or forced into exile all the top VNQDĐ leaders. The new government Ho Chi Minh announced in October effectively excluded nationalist elements not under Viet Minh control.⁷⁰ In March 1946, Bao Dai left the country to live in self-imposed exile in Hong Kong.⁷¹ When the break came, Ho Chi Minh was free to concentrate on the French.

"Vo Nguyen Giap may have been the genius of violence, . . . but it was the brilliant organizational maneuvering of Ho Chi Minh that delivered the clear victory."⁷² Under Ho Chi Minh's leadership, the entire Vietnamese populace north of the 16th parallel was organized against the French. Every hamlet became a haven - a hospital, a supply base, an important part of an intricate intelligence net, and a source of recruits.⁷³ This organization of the villages was started with the FIA youths trained in Canton and Hong Kong.

The Viet Minh were not as successful in organizing the Cochinese. The regime in the north did not have the same degree of control over the southern Viet Minh that they had over the northern organization.

Viet Minh fortunes in the South might best be summed up paradoxically as a successful failure. From the start, the Viet Minh alienated the

⁶⁹Hammer, 175-187. ⁷⁰Pike, 43-44. ⁷¹Fall, 208. ⁷²Pike, 43.

⁷³Lt. Col. Marc E. Geneste, "Guerrilla Warfare," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 265-266.

South Vietnamese. . . . They dealt too harshly with the easy-going Southerner. . . . The communication channel between Hanoi and Saigon was undependable, and liaison within the South was difficult. . . . Finally, the international situation was such as to favor more active pursuit of the Resistance above the 16th parallel, particularly after the Chinese Communists seized control of China. However, the Southern Viet Minh was able to force the French into a defensive and then passive position fairly early in the war and eventually to wrest from them political control in large parts of the South, but this came by default, not by combat.⁷⁴

Although the Viet Minh eliminated many of the top leaders in 1945 and 1946, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious sects remained a force in the south during the war. The Hoa Hao organized an area south of Saigon, and the Cao Dai an area to the west of Saigon. The confusion after 1946, permitted these forces to grow in both political (organizational) and in military strength. Both groups came to terms with the French, and therefore hindered a consolidation of Viet Minh power in the South.⁷⁵

On September 10, 1947 the French made an appeal to the Vietnamese rebels. They offered a large degree of native control over native affairs, with French control of military installations and foreign policy, subject to Indochina remaining in the French Union. The offer included an amnesty and provisions for prisoner-exchange. Ho Chi Minh's government was not even mentioned, however, and the Viet Minh did not respond to the appeal. The Viet Minh were in a strong political position, they controlled large segments of the country and the populace, while the French controlled a few major cities and some lines of communication.⁷⁶

On May 20, 1948, the French proclaimed the Central Provisional Vietnam Government, embracing Cochin China, Annam, and Tongking. It was headed initially by the Vietnamese head of the French-recognized separate

⁷⁴Pike, 48.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Hall, 801-803.

government of Cochin China. In March 1949, the French persuaded Bao Dai to return and in December 1949, the Bao Dai became head of the new French "dominion." On January 19, 1950, the Chinese Communists recognized Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the legal government, giving the Viet Minh an active sanctuary to the north. On February 6, 1950, Britain and the United States recognized the Bao Dai government.⁷⁷

French operations in the first year of the war to secure the strategic points within the Red River Delta and Upper Tongking were largely successful. The situation developed into a stalemate, with the main force of the Viet Minh in the heavily wooded mountains along the Sino-Tongkingese border, and the French unable to muster the strength necessary to pursue them. The Viet Minh used this period to train and further organize their forces. By 1949, the French were faced with thirty Viet Minh battalions under Vo Nguyen Giap.⁷⁸

In the fall of 1950, Giap's troops struck the French, quickly overrunning many of the isolated border posts. The weather precluded effective air support of ground troops, and French casualties ran high. The government at home wanted the civilians evacuated and the Expeditionary Force in Indochina recalled. Ho Chi Minh stated that he would be in Hanoi by the fourth anniversary of the war, December 19, 1950.⁷⁹

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny was assigned as the French

⁷⁷Ibid., 803-804.

⁷⁸Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina: The Seven-Year Dilemma," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 257.

⁷⁹Fall, "Indochina . . . ", 257-259.

Commander in Chief on December 17, 1950. Under his guidance, the French crushed the Viet Minh offensive by early 1951, inflicting serious losses on Giap's forces. Giap had attempted to move into the third, or war of movement, phase of his campaign too quickly. He retreated back into northern Tongking to reorganize.⁸⁰

General de Lattre then began to construct his famous fortified line in the Red River Delta. More than 10,000 forts, bunkers and concrete emplacements were built, and manned by 120,000 to 140,000 troops. General de Lattre struck from behind this fortified line with armor and airborne stabs into the Viet Minh held area, thus retaining some degree of initiative.⁸¹

In December 1951, General Salan replaced General de Lattre. He soon let the initiative slip back to the Viet Minh and "a certain 'Maginot Line' or 'wall psychology' spirit . . . developed in the French High Command."⁸² The Viet Minh response to this elaborate defensive position was two fold. They infiltrated the line freely, operating within the Red River Delta with as many as 30,000 men. Secondly, in the fall of 1952, they turned south into the highlands, threatening Laos. The French reaction to this maneuver was to commit more and more forces to isolated fortresses at the end of air lines of communication, some of which were as long as 400 miles. The Viet Minh easily by-passed these strongholds, tying down another 20,000 to 30,000 French soldiers, in addition to those tied to the Red River Delta defenses. Famed Dien Bien Phu, on the Laotian border, was one of these isolated outposts. It fell on May 8, 1954, and the war ended on July 21.⁸³

⁸⁰Ibid., 257.

⁸¹Ibid., 258-259.

⁸²Ibid., 259.

⁸³Fall, The Two Vietnams, 118-129.

By the time the cease fire was signed, the French had retained only control over small areas around Dalat and Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands, Haiphong and Hanoi, and little else outside Cochinchina. The road between Hanoi and Haiphong had been under almost daily attacks since March; the major airfield at Haiphong had been raided by the Viet Minh in March, destroying thirty-eight aircraft. Some 60,000 Viet Minh troops were operating inside the Red River Delta defenses.⁸⁴

Many reasons have been advanced for the French defeat in Vietnam. They were certainly weakened by having to face a well entrenched, organized native government, backed by a strong nationalist movement, upon their return.⁸⁵ They were further handicapped by the lateness of their arrival after World War II, the Allied decision to have the Chinese occupy the northern part of the country, and the relatively weak forces with which they were forced to re-enter the country.⁸⁶ The active sanctuary provided by Communist China after 1949 was a major advantage to the Viet Minh.⁸⁷ The active opposition in France to the Indochina war had its effect in lowered morale of the Army, and the government's failure to support the Army manpower needs with draftees.⁸⁸

Assistance to the French was denied by United States officers and representatives on the scene prior to the end of and immediately after World War II. During the early stages of the conflict there was no significant United States support.⁸⁹ However, after the French established and the United States recognized the Bao Dai government,

⁸⁴Ibid. ⁸⁵Hammer, 98-107. ⁸⁶Fall, The Two Vietnams, 60-74.

⁸⁷Hammer, 232, 250.

⁸⁸Geneste, 265-266. Fall, The Two Vietnams, 109.

⁸⁹Ibid., 49-58, 66-71.

material aid was furnished the French. The volume of this support continued to increase as the war progressed.⁹⁰ It has been alleged that another factor which hastened the French loss was the cease fire agreement reached in Korea in July 1953. This agreement permitted the Chinese to provide the Viet Minh greater support than she had been able to do while fighting in Korea.⁹¹

French populace and resources control efforts in the Indochina War were ineffective. As has been noted in chapters one and two, Magsaysay succeeded in establishing effective control of the populace and their resources by convincing the Filipinos of the government's sincere concern for their welfare. In Malaya, the British succeeded in controlling the people and resources by developing and implementing a tight system for physical control of the populace and resources to deny them to the insurgents. On the other hand,

the French military conquered villages and then alienated them. Throughout the French-held territory, the Communists operated a terroristic underground which tossed hand grenades, collected taxes, murdered "traitors", and mocked French power. If the French had succeeded, by the kind of genius which led the British to give up India in a tactful and profitable way, or by the kind of toughness which the Japanese had used in massacring any bystander who so much as looked like "opposition," either in creating a despotic but safe colonial regime or in setting up genuinely pro-French Viet Nameese nationalists, they might have gotten one hundred per cent return from their military campaign against the rebels.

But from 1946 to the present [1951] the French threw away in the cities what they gained in the country.⁹²

In 1952, the French General commanding the northern theater inaugurated a program of developing protected villages, based on the

⁹⁰Hammer, 271, 313-317. ⁹¹Fall, The Two Vietnams, 124.

⁹²Paul M. A. Linebarger, "Indochina: The Bleeding War," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Part 6, p. 250.

British experience in Malaya. Bernard B. Fall states that these villages had attractive market areas, well-built houses, electricity, and fortifications, including concrete bunkers. This plan of individually defended villages was not widespread or extensively used. 60,000 Viet Minh were operating within the Red River Delta area when the war ended. However, some three million persons were relocated to place them within fortified areas of the Red River Delta in the interest of security.⁹³

An example of the ineffectiveness of the French efforts to restore government control to an area held by the Viet Minh was "Operation Camargue," conducted on July 28, 1953. The objective of the operation was to eliminate the threat posed to French convoys on National Route 1 north of Hue by Viet Minh Regiment 95. This stretch of Route 1 was known to the French soldiers as the "Street Without Joy." The French employed forces approximately equivalent to a reinforced ROAD Infantry division, including infantry, parachute infantry, armor and marine units. The plan was to conduct two amphibious assaults early on D-Day, July 28, 1953, in coordination with the movement of three land groupments, to seal off an area approximately fourteen kilometers long by four kilometers wide to entrap the Viet Minh regiment and their guerrilla supporters. By employing the parachutists, initially held in reserve, the force was able to complete the encirclement by nightfall on D-Day. However, 95th Regiment, by sacrificing one company in a rear guard role, had managed to escape with the bulk of the unit intact before the encirclement was complete. At daylight on D+1, the encircling forces began to move forward.⁹⁴

⁹³Fall, The Two Vietnams, 372-373.

⁹⁴Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (3d ed. rev.; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1963), pp. 141-152, 164-165.

The trap had been sprung on the "Street Without Joy." The steel jaws of a modern armed force, supported by naval ships, amphibious tanks, and aircraft, had slammed shut on a force of hurriedly trained farmers led by men, who, in only a few cases, had received the training of corporals and sergeants. A trap ten times the size of the force to be trapped, had shut - and had caught nothing.⁹⁵

The failure to destroy the 95th Regiment was a factor that should have been considered in planning for the establishment of government control and influence. The French brought with the forces assigned to the operation, civil administrators of the Bao Dai regime to remain in the villages after they had been cleared. The combat elements searched the villages, rounded up suspects, and by D+3 began to evacuate the area. On 4 August, the eighth day, the operation was officially terminated.⁹⁶

The effects of the French failure to institute effective populace and resources control measures in the area they liberated are best illustrated by a conversation between two French officers who participated in "Operation Camargue."

"Funny," said Major Derrieu from the 6th Spahis, watching some of the new administrators in the village of Dong-Que, "they just never seem to succeed in striking the right note with the population. Either they come in and try to apologize for the mess we've just made with our planes and tanks; or they swagger and threaten the farmers as if they were enemy nationals which-let's face it-they are in many cases."

"That may be so," said young Lieutenant Dujardin, standing on the shady side of his M-24, "but I wouldn't care to be in his shoes tonight, when we pull out. He's going to stay right here in the house which the Commie commander still occupied yesterday, all by himself with the other four guys of his administrative team, with the nearest post three hundred yards away. Hell, I'll bet he won't even sleep here but sleep in the post anyway."

"He probably will, and he'll immediately lose face with the population and become useless."

"And if he doesn't, he'll probably be dead by tomorrow, and just as useless. In any case there goes the whole psychological effect

⁹⁵Ibid., 165.

⁹⁶Ibid., 167.

of the operation and we can start the whole thing all over again three months from now. What a hopeless mess."

"Well, if the Vietnamese can't lick that, we certainly cannot. After all, it's their country. Let's saddle up." With a shrug, both men walked back to their tanks, climbing into the turrets with the litleness of long practice.⁹⁷

The operation succeeded in deterring ambushes by the 95th Regiment for a few months. By the spring of 1954, they were again active on "The Street Without Joy." When the cease fire was declared in July 1954, the members of the 95th Regiment emerged from their hiding places, secured their weapons from the caches in the nearby marches and swamps and marched boldly up Route 1 in broad daylight past elements of the French forces that they had fought so bitterly.⁹⁸

The French attempted to conquer Vietnam, as opposed to pacify it. They failed to realize or properly evaluate the depth or the intensity of the Vietnamese nationalist movement of liberation. Initially they attempted to restore de facto French control; later, the appeal of the Bao Dai regime was not strong enough to offset the desire for independence.⁹⁹

The French also failed to realize that the Communists, the hard core of the Viet Minh, were able to organize, guide, and manipulate this strong sense of nationalism to further their aims. To attempt to crush this system with an inadequate military force, while offering no outlet for an expression of nationalism, invited disaster. The basic policies that guided the employment of the forces available to the French, and the relative size of the Viet Minh force, precluded an effective populace and resources control program.

The 1954 Geneva accords divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Ho Chi Minh headed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the north,

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Ibid., 168-170. ⁹⁹Linebarger, 248-252.

and Bao Dai the Republic of Vietnam in the south.¹⁰⁰ Bao Dai had received complete political independence from France on June 4, 1954. The agreement provided for a Vietnam-wide referendum to be held in 1956 to determine the future status of the two parts created. On June 19, 1954, Ngo Dinh Diem became Premier in the Bao Dai regime, with "absolute dictatorial powers."¹⁰¹ On October 23, 1954, a national referendum was held in South Vietnam to decide between a monarchy to be headed by Bao Dai and a republic headed by Diem. The election was tainted with irregularities, but Diem was swept in with a vote favoring him by more than ninety-eight percent.¹⁰²

Beginning January 1, 1955, the United States ceased sending economic aid for the Vietnamese through the French, delivering it directly instead. A joint French-United States military training team was maintained, however, until the French Army element departed in April 1956. The United States then began shouldering the primary responsibility for advising and assisting South Vietnam.¹⁰³

During the period 1955 to 1960, terrorist activities and other insurgent actions mounted in frequency and intensity. There is little agreement among observers as to when the current insurgency in South Vietnam began, but there is no doubt that by late 1960, it was a reality. During this five year period, United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) personnel in Vietnam produced an eight division South Vietnamese Army. This army was trained primarily to fight a Korean-type invasion and not to counter an insurgency. Training of paramilitary forces was not emphasized before the 1960's, and the training of the

¹⁰⁰Pike, 51.

¹⁰²Ibid., 255-257.

¹⁰¹Fall; The Two Vietnams, 244.

¹⁰³Ibid., 318-322.

police was not oriented on the internal defense problems.¹⁰⁴

Several factors contributed to the emphasis given the preparation for a conventional war and the lack of emphasis placed on preparation to defeat an insurgency. The first was the evaluation of the threat and the experience of the senior MAAG personnel responsible for the training. Competent MAAG chiefs, highly qualified in conventional military organization and training matters, produced the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Another drawback was the apparent reluctance to recognize the insurgency for what it was. At least until 1959, one official theory held that the violence in South Vietnam was due to a remnant of Viet Minh who were opposed to the Diem government. The tempo of terrorist and insurgent activity was increasing. Recognition of this fact was emphasized by the establishment in February 1962 of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, headed by General Paul D. Harkins.¹⁰⁵ The number of American military personnel assigned to USMACV continued to grow throughout Diem's tenure.

In December 1960, the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF) was formed by political cadres that had been sent into the South by Ho Chi Minh's regime. This organization embraced a wide variety of dissidents, including former Viet Minh opposed to Diem, elements of the militant religious sects, and perhaps others opposed to the Diem government and with no other method available to express their dissatisfaction. The NLF is a politico-military organization, within which the armed guerrilla units are commonly called the Viet Cong (VC).¹⁰⁶

Diem instituted a number of populace and resources control measures

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 317-326, 369. Pike, 74-76.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 282, 322-328. ¹⁰⁶Pike, 74, 84.

that increased in scope as the insurgency grew. The guarantees for personal liberties and freedom were set aside at the time the constitution for the Republic was adopted. The constitution never became fully operative during Diem's tenure. Diem had the power necessary to deal with opponents to his regime. Normally, individuals or small groups were not interfered with by the government or the police unless they represented a threat to Diem's position. If they did, they were arrested and went to jail. By means of these powers, and by astute political maneuvering to maintain control of the central government, if not the countryside.¹⁰⁷

The most significant populace and resources control program of the Diem regime was the strategic hamlet program, inaugurated in March 1962. This concept was lifted from the British experience in Malaya. Ideally, the rural Vietnamese were to be collected into new villages, where they would defend themselves against VC attack with government supplied arms. To meet the requirements of physical security the government had to provide the means of defense. First, the regular Army forces were to rid the area of major VC units and provide a security screen behind which other government defense measures could be taken. This included arming and training a local militia as well as the construction of defense barriers around each village. The motivation of the individual villager was considered important to the success of the program. To develop this motivation, the government attempted to provide economic opportunities, local government, rule by law, greater access to government services, and a connection by radio with other government forces. The program was designed to physically separate the villager from the

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 57-61, 63. Fall, The Two Vietnams, 259-288.

VC, and to provide an opportunity for the government, by psychological operations, to widen the gap created between the guerrilla and the villager.¹⁰⁸

The ARVN was required on occasion to assist in moving the peasants to the new strategic hamlets.¹⁰⁹ However, the administration of the program was under the direct supervision of Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother.¹¹⁰ This freed the ARVN to deal with the VC. However, the inability, and in some cases the reluctance, of the ARVN units to locate and destroy the main VC units in the areas where strategic hamlets were built was a major weakness of the overall scheme. President Diem did not want reports of heavy casualties, and tended to favor those province and district chiefs who reported few casualties and large percentages of their area safely under government control. Ambitious men therefore painted good pictures in glowing reports, spinning a web of deception and intrigue that virtually precluded aggressive offensive operations with a prospect of heavy casualties. Operational plans by ARVN units often had a deliberate escape hatch built in.¹¹¹ As Sir Robert Thompson said: "Military operations, particularly in the Mekong Delta, were not designed to support the advance of the strategic hamlet programme."¹¹² By 1964, the first four strategic hamlets that had been built were lost to the VC.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸Pike, 64-65.

¹⁰⁹Fall, The Two Vietnams, 374.

¹¹⁰Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 125-126.

¹¹¹David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 136-189.

¹¹²Thompson, 141.

¹¹³Thompson, 140.

Despite large-scale American assistance, the strategic hamlet program failed. After Diem's overthrow, the concept was modified and renamed the New Life Hamlet program.¹¹⁴ The reasons for this failure were:

1. The program became oriented almost exclusively on the military and security aspects, to the exclusion of the psychological preparation of the participating villager. The peasant did not always understand why he was moved from his ancestral home into a fortified village where his movements were restricted, and where he was required to provide extra work for the village defense.¹¹⁵
2. Villagers were often not properly compensated for the land and possession which they were forced to abandon.¹¹⁶
3. The ARVN failed to keep its part of the bargain, as noted above. Large VC units were able to successfully strike villages before the ARVN could, or would, react.
4. The hasty implementation of the program, with its inept administration and the arming of people of doubtful loyalty to the government, were serious shortcomings. Whereas it had taken three years to build 500 new villages in Malaya, over 8,000 were built in South Vietnam in the first nine months of 1963 alone.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴Ibid., 61.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 68.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Fall, The Two Vietnams, 367. Halberstam, 180-193.

¹¹⁸Thompson, 129-141.

CHAPTER IV

CRITERIA FOR A POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL DOCTRINE

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the principles which contributed to successful populace and resources control (PRC) activities in the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam. These principles will be used in Chapter VI as the criteria for evaluating current U.S. Army doctrine for PRC activities.

Each of the internal defense situations examined in the preceding three chapters is unique. In each case, the dissidents' methods of operation were strongly influenced by the political and social heritage of the country, by the physical environment, and by the government response to the threat they posed. Yet, these three situations have much in common. All three show the unsurpassed Communist capability for capturing control of nationalist movements. Even in Malaya the Communist terrorists were able to capitalize on the nationalistic desire for Malayan independence until the British eliminated the basis for this sham by granting the Federation of Malaya full independence on August 31, 1957.¹ The Communist leaders in each of the three internal defense cases studied were able to identify and capitalize on grievances the populace held

¹Anthony Short, "Communism and the Emergency," Malaysia: A Survey, ed. Wang Gungwu (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 159-160.

against the established political and social order. Japanese success in Southeast Asia provided a climate of disorder and confusion in which the Communist movement in each country grew in strength, while establishing a certain rapport and understanding with large segments of the populace.² This was particularly true in Vietnam where the returning French found an established de facto government in operation. As Vo Nguyen Giap said, "Revolutionary armed struggle in any country has common fundamental laws. Revolutionary armed struggle in each country has characteristics and laws of its own too."³

From the study of internal defense operations in the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam, certain principles were determined to have been decisive in successful populace and resources control operations. These principles are listed and analyzed below.

Early priority must be given to establishing an effective intelligence net. Intelligence is a critical commodity in internal defense operations. Without intelligence, the government efforts tend to flail, often inflicting as much damage or injury on the pro-government or apathetic portion of the populace as on the insurgent apparatus. Magsaysay took a personal interest in intelligence, as discussed in Chapter I, and insured that effective intelligence means existed from national down to battalion level. In Malaya, the British centralized intelligence activities under the police Special Branch and made the product available at

²Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) pp. 14-15.

³Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army; (facsimile ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) p. 68.

all levels, to both military and civilian agencies.⁴ In both the Philippines and Malaya, the success of intelligence efforts and PRC activities were complementary - the success in one field significantly aided success in the other.⁵

PRC measures instituted by the government of the nation experiencing insurgency and its allies must be clearly within the bounds of established law. This is a condition which the threatened government can normally meet very easily, by prompt legislative action or executive decree. In a turbulent and unstable society which does not have a tradition of rule by an intricate, modern, codified system of laws, it is essential that the legislators or rulers have a clear understanding of what the society traditionally considers just, fair and correct. The absence of a written constitution and an extensive, formal code of law does not present a major obstacle to the fair, just and humane treatment of its citizens by an honest government. For example, Great Britain, one of the more stable Western nations, does not have a written constitution and depends heavily on its centuries-old system of common law for justice. Magsaysay's success in the Philippines, discussed in Chapter I, was due in a large measure to his understanding of and empathy with the people of his nation, and his uncommon willingness to let his actions be guided by this knowledge and understanding. In an internal defense situation, all government actions can quickly become grist for the insurgents' propaganda mill. Any unfair or excessively repressive measure can be further distorted by the insurgents to their benefit.

The position of the government faced with an insurgency was

⁴Supra, 53.

⁵Supra, 27-28, 57.

aptly stated by Sir Robert Thompson when he said:

There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with guerrilla actions for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for an insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create even more practical difficulties for a government than it solves.

Action in accordance with the law was a vital factor during the Huk insurgency in the Philippines where Magsaysay made a reality of the constitution, and in Malaya, where the civil courts operated normally throughout the Emergency. There is nothing to prevent a government enacting very tough laws to cope with the situation, but the golden rule should be that each new law must be effective and must be fairly applied.⁶

Contrasted with the favorable results cited above of establishing and adhering to laws passed to cope with the situation, the Diem government in South Vietnam passed Law 10/59 in 1959 which provided for the repression of acts of sabotage and terrorism. Individuals charged with these acts were brought before special tribunals whose only option in sentencing was death or life imprisonment. There was no appeal from these tribunals. The law was improperly administered, and "quite often became a weapon of local vendettas."⁷ This type of justice alienated not only the victims and their families but also others with a sense of justice and fairplay. Again, Sir Robert Thompson states that: "Military tribunals can never be satisfactorily justified. They are in themselves a tacit admission that responsible government has broken down."⁸

PRC activities must be closely coordinated with counter guerrilla

⁶Thompson, 52-53.

⁷Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge: The M.I.I. Press, 1966), p. 72.

⁸Thompson, 54.

operations, environmental improvement (civic action) programs, psychological operations, intelligence activities, and other government functions in the area concerned. Of the three internal defense situations studied, the actions taken by the British in Malaya, discussed in Chapter II, offer the best example of the effective coordination of government-military-police activities at all levels. The appointment of Sir Gerald Templar by the British Government to serve concurrently as both Director of Operations and High Commissioner in Malaya facilitated this coordination.⁹ The objective of this coordination is to achieve, to the degree possible, unity of command and unity of effort.

When coordination is effective, priorities for security, for example, can be aligned with the priorities for environmental improvement efforts, and F&C measures can be more easily integrated into the economic pattern of the areas in which they are applied. Intelligence can be more easily pooled and exchanged, and meaningful psychological operations integrated into the overall scheme to support the government programs.¹⁰

The insurgent must be separated from the local populace. This separation may be primarily psychological, as in the Philippines, or it may be both physical and psychological as in Malaya. In both cases, physical security equal to the threat posed by the insurgents was essential. The purpose of separating the insurgent from the populace is to deny him intelligence, recruits, food and other supplies, shelter, and the advantage of anonymity gained by mixing freely with the people. In addition to these obviously practical reasons, it is essential that the insurgents be denied the opportunity to build a shadow government, or

⁹Ibid., 81-85.

¹⁰Richard L. Clutterbuck, "Communist Defeat in Malaya", Internal Defense Operations: A Case History; Malaya, 1948-1960 RB 31-2 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, The Command and General Staff College, 1966), p. 23.

parallel hierarchy as Bernard B. Fall calls it.¹¹

To clarify this point, it is necessary to make a distinction between insurgents fighting a revolutionary or insurgent war to wrest control of the state from the duly constituted government, and those irregular forces which conduct guerrilla warfare. AR 320-5 defines guerrilla warfare as "military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory, by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces."¹² (Italics mine). Insurgent war, on the other hand, is defined as

a struggle between a constituted government and organized insurgents frequently supported from without, but acting violently from within, against a political, social, economic, military and civil vulnerabilities of the regime to bring about its internal destruction or overthrow. Such wars are distinguished from lesser insurgencies by the gravity of the threat to government and the insurgent object of eventual regional or national control.¹³

The insurgent cannot be concerned only with the destruction of the government's military capability and the elimination of government systems. To this end, government institutions and organizations are infiltrated to gain control from within, and insurgent intelligence agents, tax collectors, and propagandists compete covertly or openly with their counterparts of the legal government.

Indeed, a guerrilla force must eventually build up a working administrative structure, maintain or provide schooling and a modicum of economic life (i.e. 'construct' rather than simply destroy) within its area of operation, if it wants to succeed in the long run. . . . Any guerrilla movement that remains in a sterile destructive phase either is only a commando force or degenerates into pure banditry.¹⁴

¹¹Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 132.

¹²U.S., Department of the Army, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, C-2, AR 320-5 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 21 February 1966), p. 190.1.

¹³Ibid., 212.

¹⁴Ibid., 344-345.

The separation of the insurgent from the populace weakens him in the tactical sense by denying him the means for continuing his destructive operations against the government forces. Equally important is the requirement to identify and neutralize his infrastructure, his shadow government that accomplishes the concurrent insurgent task of building a control apparatus over the populace.

The study of the insurgencies in the Philippines, Malaya and Vietnam has clearly shown that the distinction made between insurgent war and guerrilla warfare by AR 320-5 is not only valid but absolutely essential in determining how to best counter a particular armed insurgency. In the Philippines, as discussed in Chapter I, President Roxas' "mailed fist" policy to attempt to defeat the Huks by force alone failed, because the essentially political nature of the struggle was overlooked in favor of a military effort to crush the movement. Magsaysay succeeded in part due to his understanding of the political, social and economic aspects of the total problem that constituted the insurgency. Magsaysay's dual policy of unrelenting force against those insurgents who chose to continue to resist the government and "attraction and fellowship" for those who wished to begin a new life as peaceful citizens was successful because it recognized all aspects of the social, political and military problem that the Huk movement represented.¹⁵

Material resources of value to the insurgents must be identified and controlled. Certain resources, such as chemicals, metals, tools, explosives, ammunition, weapons, radios, vehicles and cameras may be highly valued by the insurgent forces. These items must be identified,

¹⁵Supra, 31.

declared contraband, or required to be registered with the proper local authorities. Movement of these materials must be closely controlled and carefully protected to prevent capture by the insurgents. Gaining control initially may be difficult. In an attempt to gain control of weapons in Malaya, the British offered a reward of \$350 per weapon for their turn in after World War II.¹⁶

The use of rewards is sometimes effective, but obviously cannot be fully relied upon when dealing with dedicated insurgents. As the British discovered, the Communist Terrorists in Malaya had adequate weapons for their purposes, in addition to those surrendered, carefully cached in the jungles. More positive measures were required to control items of contraband in Malaya. Unannounced searches and seizures, searches at checkpoints and roadblocks, and detailed police work were all necessary to cut off the flow of supplies to the insurgents.

The people affected by a PRC program must be thoroughly indoctrinated concerning the specific nature, purpose and duration of the restrictions, and penalties established for violations. One of the reasons given for the failure of Diem's strategic hamlet program in South Vietnam was the failure to offer adequate explanation to the relocated people. Often the farmer who was forced to leave his ancestral home was not told the reasons for the sudden move, or for the new restrictions suddenly placed on him.¹⁷

In Malaya, on the other hand, the government expended a major effort to explain to the resettled Chinese squatters the reasons for their dislocation, as well as for the restrictions imposed on their

¹⁶Supra., 45.

¹⁷Pike, 68.

activities.¹⁸

A PRC plan must be enforceable to the extent and in the areas specified. This requires a careful analysis of the requirements of the plan and of the resources available. In the three historical examples of insurgency studied, there were inadequate resources initially to implement an effective internal defense plan in all parts of the country simultaneously. Priorities were therefore essential.

In Malaya, priority was given to the densely populated coastal strip. Army elements of the security forces were employed to break up the large terrorist units into bands small enough to hold out against terrorist attacks.¹⁹ Priority in the Philippines went to the four provinces in Central Luzon known as "Huklandia" where the Huk activity was most intense. This was also the most densely populated area of the Republic and was a major food producing center.²⁰

The essential lesson is that in the areas the government forces choose to operate, they must insure success by allocating sufficient resources to meet the total threat. When resources are limited, priorities are necessary. In South Vietnam, the strategic hamlet program, a major PRC measure of the Diem regime, failed in part because the regular Army forces failed to keep the large scale Viet Cong units away from the hamlets.²¹

Government PRC measures instituted, such as search, pass and identification card issue, food control, census and populace registration, curfew and the operation of check points must be done in a relatively

¹⁸Clutterbuck, 27.

¹⁹Clutterbuck, 21.

²⁰Supra., 23, 26-28.

²¹Fall, 378-379. Pike, 65.

secure area, free from interference by major insurgent elements. In addition to the security forces needed to provide this screen of protection, forces are needed to accomplish the PRC tasks listed above, and to accomplish other PRC tasks that may be necessary.

The PRC activities of Magsaysay in the Philippines and the British in Malaya emphasized the use of local security and police forces. The military commanders in both countries assisted in the development of these forces, and incorporated paramilitary and police force operations in security operations by Army units. The French, on the other hand, were more reluctant to develop and use indigenous forces. A significant effort in this area was not made until after U.S. military aid began in 1950.²²

By initially clearing an area of main force insurgent units, the military commander can reduce the insurgent threat to the point where militia and police units can effectively provide security for the PRC effort. The role of the police is extremely critical. One author estimates that the Malayan Emergency could have been avoided if an adequate police system had been in being in 1948.²³ The police at district level, for example, can often provide valuable information on the populace of a particular village, even if the village is not under government control. Including locally available police and security forces in the overall scheme of the PRC plan, on the basis of coordination and cooperation, can significantly enhance the military commander's capability for PRC activities.

²²Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina: The Seven Year Dilemma," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 258.

²³Clutterbuck, 33.

An effective PRC program must be flexible, Magsaysay's overall conduct of the internal defense effort in the Philippines, and particularly his PRC activities, best illustrate this point. Flexibility is a term that has lost impact with perhaps too frequent usage. Magsaysay's Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) land settlement project for rehabilitated Huks, provision of medical and legal services to the populace with Army personnel, and his ability to see the necessity for offering amnesty and economic opportunity to those Huks who would cooperate with the government certainly exemplify flexibility.²⁴

Flexibility is essential to insure that the measures and techniques adopted fit the situation. Not only do the conditions of revolutionary warfare vary from country to country, but they may also vary widely within a given country.²⁵ Conditions of terrain and weather, transportation and communications networks available, ethnic and religious composition of the populace, the educational level of the country, the type government, and the history, traditions, customs and mores of the people are only some of the factors that were influential in the conduct of internal defense operations in the Philippines, Malaya, and Vietnam. Flexibility of mind, method, employment, control and general concept is essential to success.

²⁴Supra., 26-32.

²⁵George K. Tanham et al., War Without Arms: American Civilians in Rural Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 32-92.

PART II. DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE DEFINITIVE DOCTRINE

CHAPTER V

CURRENT U. S. ARMY DOCTRINE FOR POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

Populace and resources control (PRC) activities are those measures applied to "detect and neutralize the insurgency apparatus and operations in the community; sever population support of the guerrilla insurgent ; and provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the population."¹ Current U.S. Army doctrine pertaining to the conduct of PRC activities by a ROAD Infantry division is found in several field manuals and other official publications. The purpose of this chapter is to extract from these sources existing doctrine that pertains to PRC activities by a ROAD Infantry division and to synthesize this material into a single expression of doctrine.

With the exception of FM 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces, the field manuals concerned with internal defense operations emphasize the role of the advisor and the Special Action Forces (SAF) in assisting the host country prevent or defeat an insurgency, as opposed to the employment of units above brigade level in an active internal defense role. FM 31-22: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces is specifically limited in application to "U.S. Army Special Action

¹U.S., Department of the Army, Psychological Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, FM 33-1 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 34.

Forces (SAF), specially trained, brigade-size backup forces, support units, and individuals who are deployed to advise, train and/or provide assistance to a host country's counterinsurgency [internal defense] forces."² FM 31-16: Counter guerrilla Operations, is addressed to the conduct of counter guerrilla operations by infantry and airborne infantry brigades, battalions and companies.³ However, because this material is part of the total body of doctrine available, and because the manuals are referenced in FM 61-100: The Division, applicable portions are incorporated into the restatement of doctrine presented in this chapter. This is done fully realizing that the material is directed to users other than those at the ROAD Infantry division level.

FM 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces, provides "guidance to the commanders and staffs of combined arms forces which have a primary mission of eliminating irregular forces."⁴ The manual states that the operations and procedures outlined may be required in situations where the irregular force is the only enemy, or threatens rear areas of regular military forces which are conducting conventional operations.⁵ The term irregular is used "in the broad sense to refer to all types of nonconventional forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, partisan, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations and methods."⁶

²U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, FM 31-22 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 3.

³U.S., Department of the Army, Counter guerrilla Operations, FM 31-16 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 2.

⁴U.S., Department of the Army, Operations Against Irregular Forces, FM 31-15 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1961), p.33

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

FM 41-10: Civil Affairs Operations (draft), is broader in scope than the manuals referred to above and provides a comprehensive concept of internal defense planning and operations at the national level. In addition, the organizational framework in the host country for developing and implementing an internal defense plan outlined in the manual provides a backdrop for discussion of PRC activities by a ROAD Infantry division assigned an internal defense mission. Although this manual is currently in draft form, it will be published in the near future without significant modification to the material referenced herein.⁷

The host country internal defense plan will include counter guerrilla warfare, PRC, and environmental improvement programs.⁸ The national internal defense plan coordinates these three basic programs and integrates intelligence activities and psychological warfare operations into the national internal defense effort.⁹

"A populace and resources control plan must be initiated and planned at the national level to insure cohesiveness, completeness, and realism."¹⁰ All ministries of the host government should participate in preparing the plan, which must include "a determination of critical material assets; enforceable restrictions . . . ; positive reporting and analysis procedures; supervision techniques; and an information program to explain the [PRC] program to the populace."¹¹ Planning at the national level facilitates the coordination of all internal defense programs and permits the government to provide a legal basis for control measures

⁷U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 41-10 (draft) (Fort Gordon, Georgia: Civil Affairs Agency, CDC, 1966), pp. 115-215.

⁸Ibid., 116.

⁹Ibid., 119.

¹⁰Ibid., 153.

¹¹Ibid.

planned.¹²

Although planning is centralized, enforcement of the PRC program must be decentralized to take advantage of the local official's greater knowledge and understanding of the problems in his area. Decentralized enforcement also tends to strengthen the government by the exercise of responsibility and authority at the subnational level. Decentralization requires supervision of local officials to insure compliance, fair and equitable enforcement of laws and regulations, and honest administration. Latitude given subnational officials should be commensurate with their demonstrated ability and results produced.¹³

The national internal defense plan provides for an effective organization to coordinate, implement, and supervise all internal defense efforts. Central direction is provided to the national effort by having the chief executive retain authority in his office, by forming an inter-ministerial committee, or by assigning full responsibility for internal defense operations to one agency of the government. Below national level, the country, or that portion threatened with insurgency, is divided into operational areas. The boundaries of operational areas may conform to existing political, administrative, or military divisions of the country, or they may be drawn to meet specific internal defense requirements. Coordination and control is facilitated if existing subnational boundaries are retained. The central government then places one individual, who may be either military or civilian, in charge of all internal defense activities in each area of operations. If the resources are available and it is otherwise desirable to do so, operational areas

¹²Ibid., 153, 161-162.

¹³Ibid., 153-154.

may be subdivided.¹⁴ For clarity and simplicity, the level reporting to the central government will be referred to as "Province," and may be composed of two or more "districts." The actual designation will vary from country to country.

At province level, an Area Security Coordination Center (ASCC) should be established for the coordination of all internal defense activities. This center should be staffed by the senior officials of each principal government agency operating in the province, the military, police and paramilitary forces. The chief of the provincial government should be chairman. The ASCC should have a Civil Military Action Committee (CMAC) as an adjunct which includes representatives of the military and of the principal civilian social and economic leaders of the area. Military units not assigned but operating in the province coordinate all of their activities through the CMAC.¹⁵

The United States has a wide range of options in assisting a nation in its effort to prevent or defeat an insurgency. The heads of the U.S. civilian and military agencies that normally contribute to this effort are collectively referred to as the country team. It is the policy of the U.S. government that the Ambassador or the principal United States Diplomatic Officer be the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission and the head of the country team. In addition to the Ambassador, the country team consists of the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), or similar agency; the chief of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission; the chief of the U.S. Information Services (USIS), the U.S. Information Agency's overseas element, which may also be known as the Public Affairs Office (PAO). The country team may also

¹⁴Ibid., 120-121.

¹⁵Ibid., 122.

have representatives from other government agencies operating in the host nation. At the national level, the country team develops a Country Internal Defense Plan to achieve approved U.S. objectives and to delineate the U.S. resources required for its accomplishment. The plan becomes the basis for program proposals, after approval in Washington by all agencies concerned.¹⁶ Representatives of USAID, USIB and other government agencies may be provided to province level. MAC advisors may be assigned to province and district, as well as to regular military units.

At this point, the basic organization of the host government to prevent or counter an insurgency has been outlined and the composition and organization of the U.S. country team has been established. When the host nation fails to prevent insurgency and proves unable to defeat it with indigenous forces, U.S. combat units, to include one or more ROAD Infantry divisions, may be committed to provide additional assistance.

When U.S. combat units are introduced into a country for internal defense operations, it is essential that a system of command or coordination be established to insure unity of effort. FM 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces states that: "Uniservice headquarters, or joint or combined commands may control operations against irregular forces in a cold war situation. Participation by the host country is normal and usually makes a combined command mandatory."¹⁷ Within the combined command, U.S. and host country forces would effect coordination, just as subordinate elements of other commands would. Foreign policy direction

¹⁶Ibid., 93-95. U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, 11.

¹⁷U.S., Department of the Army, Operations Against Irregular Forces (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 13.

for U.S. forces would be from the chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission. Coordination would be established between the MAAG element of the country team and U.S. operational forces.¹⁸

The commander of U.S. combat forces tasked to conduct operations against irregular forces in a friendly foreign nation in time of peace could exercise only that degree of authority over the irregular forces authorized by provisions of agreements between the United States and the sovereign government concerned. Such an agreement would fix responsibility for civil control and administration of liberated or secured areas.¹⁹

As was pointed out in the introduction, PRC activities are relatively more important when countering an insurgency in Phase II by means of the clear and hold method. The ROAD Infantry division, however, may be assigned a counter guerrilla or other mission that would tend to lessen the importance of PRC activities. Therefore, in examining current doctrine for PRC activities, it is assumed that the U.S. ROAD Infantry division employed in an internal defense role is assigned a clear and hold mission in a contested area where the insurgency is in Phase II.²⁰ The mission statement or operations order to the division commander would specify the area to be cleared and held.

"Clear and hold operations are concentrated in a specific high priority area experiencing overt insurgency to create a secure physical and psychological environment, [and] to establish governmental control of the area."²¹ The division commander assigned this mission should:

¹⁸Ibid., 12-13.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Supra., 89.

²¹U.S., Department of the Army, Psychological Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, 39.

1. Coordinate with the civil government and military, police and paramilitary forces in the assigned area. This coordination may be accomplished through the ASCC and CMAC, or similar agency, if operational.²²
2. Expand outward from an existing secure base.²³
3. Clear the main insurgent forces from the area to be held. This requires that sufficient combat forces be allocated to this task to provide relative safety to the forces assigned responsibility for PRC activities and includes a continuing counter guerrilla warfare program.²⁴
4. Provide for the early establishment of an intelligence network.²⁵
5. Conduct psychological operations (PSYOP) to:
 - a. Promote maximum cooperation from and cohesion within the indigenous populace. Explaining the purpose of the operation to the local populace in order to alleviate their fear, insecurity, and uncertainty, or to counter their hostility, will assist the accomplishment of this task.
 - b. Assist in lifting the population from its lethargy, encourage active participation against the insurgents, and convince the people that the government occupation is permanent.

²²U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Civil Affairs Operations, 122.

²³U.S., Department of the Army, Psychological Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, 39.

²⁴U.S., Department of the Army, Operations Against Irregular Forces, 33-34.

²⁵Ibid., 36-39.

U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces,

c. Explain the reasons for restrictions and controls to the populace, and the conditions that must be met before the restrictions are removed. Emphasize the temporary nature of the restrictions if the populace chooses to cooperate with and work actively for the government cause.

d. Promote division and discord among the insurgents. Circulate widely a full explanation of the provisions of existing amnesty programs, and encourage the guerrilla units to take advantage of these programs. Convince both the populace and the insurgent of the hopelessness of the insurgents' cause.

e. Encourage government military and civilian personnel in the worth of their cause, stressing their identity with the government efforts.

f. Publicize exemplary U.S. troop conduct. Capitalize on individual acts of generosity and kindness. The proper and correct behavior of U.S. troops will assist in winning the loyalty and confidence of the local populace for the government's cause.²⁶

6. Establish PRC measures which are legal and absolutely essential, and which can be enforced. These measures may include:

a. Curfew, with due consideration to legitimate needs of the people.

b. Travel restrictions, imposed by the establishment of fixed and mobile roadblocks and by patrols.

²⁶ U.S., Department of the Army, Psychological Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, 37-41.

U.S., Department of the Army, Operations Against Irregular Forces, 17-18, 39.

- c. Establishment of restricted areas.
 - d. Censorship.
 - e. Control of the production, movement storage and distribution of foodstuffs.
 - f. Issue of identification cards and photographs to individuals and family groups.
 - g. The establishment of a registration system for arms, ammunition, demolitions, all transportation means, drugs, medicines, money, livestock and other designated material.
 - h. Control of radio equipment and printing machinery.
 - i. The establishment of a reporting system for all absentee workers.
 - k. Unannounced search and seizure operations.
 - l. Denial of public utilities to areas not under government control.
 - m. The establishment of price controls and rationing system.²⁷
7. Make maximum use of national police, civil guard, municipal and local police, and civilian self-defense forces in the area of operations, and assist in the training and organization of such units as required.²⁸ This may be accomplished by:

²⁷U.S., Department of the Army, Operations Against Irregular Forces, 12-22.

U.S., Department of the Army, Counter guerrilla Operations, FM 31-16 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 37-43.

U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, 106-107.

²⁸U.S., Department of the Army, Counter guerrilla Operations, 37-38.
 U.S., Department of the Army, Operations Against Irregular Forces, 34-35.

- a. Providing initial training cadres and training facilities.
 - b. Providing training aids when possible.
 - c. Providing a communications network in the area to be held.
 - d. Augmenting local security forces with patrols from regular internal defense forces.²⁹
8. Initiate a comprehensive civic action program coordinated through the ASCC and CMAC or similar agency. Coordination with USAID and USIS personnel is necessary. Local citizen participation and the use of combined civic action teams, with both U.S. and host country forces assigned, should be considered. Medical aid, emphasizing long range health and sanitation improvement measures as well as treatment, is one possible civic action project.
- Others may be:

- a. Providing wells.
- b. Building schools, bridges, market centers or other essential structures.
- c. Civic action projects of benefit to the people, and within the capabilities of the unit.³⁰

²⁹U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, 99-108.

³⁰U.S. Army combat Developments Command, Civil Affairs Operations, 172.

U.S., Department of the Army, Counterguerrilla Operations, 99.

U.S., Department of the Army, Operations Against Irregular Forces, 18.

U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, 96-97.

This restatement of U.S. Army doctrine for the conduct of populace and resources control activities has intentionally avoided inconsistencies in terminology and apparent contradictions in the doctrine as presented in the field manuals examined. In the following chapter, the doctrine gleaned from these manuals will be examined against the criteria established in Chapter IV to determine its validity. Shortcomings and apparent contradictions in doctrine will be pointed out.

CHAPTER VI

MEASURING CURRENT U.S. ARMY POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL DOCTRINE AGAINST ESTABLISHED CRITERIA

U.S. Army doctrine now published deemphasizes the role of the division in internal defense operations.¹ The current situation in Vietnam, however, emphasizes a requirement for the U.S. Army to be prepared to participate in internal defense operations with ROAD Infantry divisions, as well as with other U.S. Army forces. Further, the requirement that U.S. units participate in the pacification program, gives emphasis to a need for doctrine for the conduct of clear and hold operations that involve populace and resources control (PRC) activities by units of division size.² The validity of current doctrine is examined in light of the criteria established in Chapter IV.

The PRC measures taken by a U.S. ROAD Infantry division committed to assist a friendly nation experiencing an insurgency will be within certain legal parameters already established by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, applicable Army Regulations, Department of Defense directives and other official policy statements, as well as certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Also influential will be the intangible impact of U.S. Army tradition and national character. In addition to

¹Supra., 1-3.

²Kansas City Star, April 16, 1967, pp. 4G, 7G-8G.

these established limits on his action, the division commander must also be cognizant of any additional limitations imposed by the laws, customs, traditions and rituals of the host nation.

The limits of action established by the host nation may in fact present no real limits to the division commander who may be restrained by the more rigid controls established by the U.S. government and the Army. Care must be exercised, however, to insure that at division level the following apparent inconsistencies in U.S. doctrine are resolved with conditions in the area of operations.

FM 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces clearly states that:

In liberated areas in which a friendly foreign government has been reestablished and in sovereign countries in time of peace, the authority which U.S. military commanders may exercise against irregular forces is limited to that permitted by the provisions of agreements which are concluded with responsible authorities of the sovereign government concerned.³

However, FM 31-22: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, states that:

The nature and scope of the measures necessary to defeat the enemy in a designated area may require actions by military commanders which infringe on the liberty and property rights of the citizens of the effected area. Such actions would normally be preceded by an announcement of a declaration of an emergency by the head of the government. Application of the strictest of population controls may be required. Martial law would be declared only as a last resort.⁴

The manual then continues to list the specific measures that may be necessary to gain control over the populace. There is no compensating stipulation in the manual that legal sanction for his actions be gained by the commander of a U.S. force given a mission of PRC.

³U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 41-10 (draft)(Civil Affairs Agency, Fort Gordon, Georgia, 1966) pp. 121-122, 161-162.

⁴U.S., Department of the Army, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, FM 31-22 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 106.

FM 31-16: Counterguerrilla Operations, while listing as a planning factor the "existing policies and directives regarding legal status and treatment of the civilian population and the guerrilla forces," states in the section dealing specifically with population control that:

Rigid population control and stern administrative measures are imposed on a populace which is collaborating with guerrilla forces. The extent of the control and the degree of sternness imposed on the civilian population depend on the situation within the assigned area.⁵

After listing specific control measures which may be used, the manual adds a warning that:

Vigorous enforcement and stern punishment is applied to carry out administrative measures. Half-heartedness or any other sign of laxness will breed contempt and defiance. Violators are apprehended and justly and rapidly punished.⁶

Early priority must be given to the establishment of an intelligence net. Current U.S. Army doctrine for PRC activities places heavy emphasis on the important role of and the need for intelligence, and provides the ROAD Infantry division Commander assigned an internal defense mission with adequate guidance.⁷

The PRC activities of the ROAD Infantry division in an internal defense role must be coordinated with the counterguerrilla warfare program, the environmental improvement (civic action) program, with psychological operations and intelligence activities, and with all host government functions in the area. To accomplish this coordination, FM 41-10: Civil Affairs Operations indicates that the ASCC is an

⁵Supra., 2.

⁶U.S., Department of the Army, Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 31-16 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 9.

⁷U.S., Department of the Army, Operations Against Irregular Forces, FM 31-15 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 38.

essential element or the organization for internal defense.⁸ FM 31-15, however, states that: "Uniservice headquarters, or joint or combined commands may control operations against irregular forces in a cold war situation. Participation by the host country is normal and usually makes a combined command mandatory."⁹

Whether the military forces committed in an internal defense role are commanded by a combined headquarters or by uniservice headquarters, coordination still must be effected at the operational area level. The ASCC outlined in FM 41-10: Civil Affairs Operations is a technique for accomplishing this coordination, while FM 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces clearly shows the requirement. The ASCC is an excellent device to develop unity of effort in the absence of a unified command.

The insurgent must be separated from the population if an internal defense effort is to be successful. Current U.S. Army doctrine to accomplish this separation, both psychological and physical, is adequate. However, FM 31-16 and FM 31-22 emphasize the police and military methods necessary to gain and maintain control over the populace and resources without due emphasis of the political aspects of the effort. All efforts by the U.S. forces, particularly a unit concerned with PRC activities, as part of a clear and hold operation, should be directed toward the ultimate objective, which is "the establishment, maintenance, or preservation of a government which can operate effectively under law to

⁸U.S., Department of the Army, Counter guerrilla Operations, 38.

⁹U.S., Department of the Army, Operations Against Irregular Forces, p. 13.

meet the needs and aspirations of its people."¹⁰

Identification and control of material resources of value to the insurgent is an important aspect of PRC by the ROAD Infantry division. The doctrine outlined in FM 31-16 adequately meets the requirement of the division commander in this field.¹¹

Current U.S. Army doctrine recognizes the requirement to explain the PRC measures instituted to the populace. As discussed in Chapter V, FM 33-1: Psychological Operations presents doctrine which adequately meets this requirement.¹²

The PRC doctrine for a ROAD Infantry division should facilitate the development of plans that are enforceable to the extent and in the areas specified. This is a function of the relationship between the legal basis established for actions by U.S. forces; the strength, activity and methods of operation of the insurgent force; the size, disposition, social and religious customs, economic activity, ethnic homogeneity, mental attitude, and relationship to the host government of the population in the area; the physical environment; and the number, type, training, and experience of forces available for the operation, both U.S. and others. Current U.S. Army doctrine adequately emphasized these factors in determining what controls will be imposed where. However, no attempt has been made in any of the field manuals to delineate methods of employment of the division resources in order to establish the PRC measures.

¹⁰U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Civil Affairs Operations, 115.

¹¹U.S., Department of the Army, Counter guerrilla Operations, 38-40.

¹²U.S., Department of the Army, Psychological Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine, 34-46.

A ROAD Infantry division commander assigned a clear and hold mission in an area of operations experiencing a Phase II insurgency can increase the capability of his unit by integrating the efforts of locally available security forces. The coordination necessary to integrate the efforts of local forces with the division effort can be accomplished through the ASCC and the Civil Military Action Council (CMAC), or similar agency.¹³

Current doctrine concerning the identification of material resources of value to the insurgent is adequate for use by the ROAD Infantry division assigned a clear and hold mission in internal defense environment where the insurgency is in Phase II. Doctrine, as defined in Chapter V, provides the fundamental principles that guide the actions of military forces. The commander and his staff recognize the authoritative nature of the doctrine, but understand that judgement is required in applying its principles.¹⁴ If the application of doctrine is to support national objectives, as the definition requires, and if the commander is to use judgement in adapting doctrine to fit the peculiarities of a particular situation, then the doctrine must be cohesive enough for the commander to be able to recognize dynamic interrelationships, and to intelligently determine what is important. When the division commander assigned an internal defense mission requiring the conduct of PRC activities must refer to several sources for doctrine, and to then resolve, collate and interpret material addressed to other levels and other type forces, the doctrine cannot be called definitive when examined in light

¹³U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Civil Affairs Operations, 121-122.

¹⁴Supra., 1.

of the division's requirements.

As established in Chapter IV, insurgency, or revolutionary warfare, is wholly distinct from guerrilla warfare in support of regular forces or in opposition to a foreign invader or hostile occupation forces. FM 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces, with its blanket application to both categories of irregular fighters, fails to make this distinction and fails to establish a conceptual framework for internal defense operations that would permit the more effective use of the material in FM 31-16 and FM 31-22 at division level.

The distinction in these two types of operations may have a significant effect on the attitude and behavior of the troops assigned the mission, command and control managements, legal authority, requirements for coordination, use of psychological operations, and the conduct of PRC activities.

Flexibility is essential to the effectiveness of a PRC doctrine, particularly at division level. Flexibility is the state of mind long emphasized by the U.S. Army. It is an essential ingredient of consistent success by any commander on any type battle field. In internal defense operations, it is particularly important because of the nature of the enemy. Current U.S. Army doctrine and training methods, as well as traditions and customs, adequately provide for flexibility in PRC activities by a ROAD Infantry division.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In Chapter V, current U.S. doctrine for the conduct of populace and resources control (PRC) activities was synthesized to provide an interpretation applicable to the ROAD Infantry division. This doctrine does not appear elsewhere in this concise and balanced form, oriented exclusively on internal defense operations.

The doctrine outlined in Chapter V is adequate, as stated, for the conduct of PRC activities by a ROAD Infantry division assigned an internal defense role. However, as the basic material exists in published field manuals, it does not provide an overall concept for PRC by a division. The relative merit of each point, the desirable or normal sequence of actions, the priority of tasks, and the relationship of the components of the restated doctrine are dependent on the particular interpretation of each commander who uses it.

The existence of a well-defined, clearly understandable statement of doctrine would facilitate the conduct of PRC activities by the ROAD Infantry division assigned a clear and hold mission, just as current doctrine concerning retrograde operations facilitates the conduct of an orderly night withdrawal.

The essentially political nature of internal defense operations requires additional emphasis in U.S. Army doctrine, specific line quotes from field manuals notwithstanding. The overall tone and tenor of current doctrine fails to properly emphasize this point in relation to the

emphasis given the conduct of counter guerrilla operations.

The failure of FM 31-15 and FM 31-16 to properly distinguish between guerrilla warfare, conducted by indigenous irregular forces against the regular forces of a foreign invader and his occupying troops, from internal defense operations is a serious shortcoming. This is one of the most decisive errors in concept made by the French in Vietnam from 1946 to 1954, as pointed out in Chapter III. An analogy does exist between the two problems. However, the defeat of the guerrilla force that presents a rear area security problem, or which is harrasing an occupying force, is basically a military problem, and the division commander tasked with the responsibility for eliminating this threat can use military means to accomplish his task. Political, social and economic measures taken support this military task. Internal defense operations, and particularly PRC activities, are primarily aimed at the eventual solution of political and social problems, with military and security overtones. The rifleman participating in a counter guerrilla operation, or manning a roadblock as part of the PRC program, against an irregular force constituting a rear area security threat in a hostile country may well perform the same task as when conducting counter guerrilla or PRC operations in an internal defense environment. However, at division level, the basic and essential difference between the tasks and status of U.S. forces when invading a hostile territory and when assisting a friendly nation in the conduct of internal defense operations cannot be overlooked.

U.S. doctrine concerning command relationships in the host country needs to be clarified. There are two systems currently proposed. One is the establishment of a combined command, with normal lateral coordination

between components, as outlined in FM 31-15. The other is a system relying primarily on coordination, as outlined in FM 41-10. The fundamental question is: "When U.S. combat units are committed in an internal defense situation, should the U.S. advocate the establishment of a combined command or rely on a system of coordination to attain unity of effort?"

The purpose of this paper is to develop a more definitive doctrine for the conduct of PRC activities by a ROAD Infantry division assigned an internal defense mission.

That definitive doctrine should be that:

1. U.S. Army doctrine for the conduct of internal defense operations by a ROAD Infantry division, to include the conduct of PRC activities, is provided to the division commander in a single document.
2. Populace and resources control activities are of major importance to the ROAD Infantry division when assigned a clear and hold mission. The counter guerrilla warfare, environmental improvement, intelligence, and psychological operations programs are closely coordinated with populace and resources control plan. A successful clear and hold operation emphasized the following points:

- (1) Clear and hold operations expand outward from a secure base. When permitted an option, the division commander gives priority to those areas of the host country most important to economic, political, and social integrity of the nation. This priority is determined by coordination with the senior host nation official in the division's assigned area, and by coordination with appropriate U.S. advisory personnel in the area. The division

should be prepared to make recommendations for priority areas based on his own consideration of the following points:

- (a) Population density. Generally, the greater the density, the more important the area.
 - (b) Recent significant insurgent activity: type and frequency of insurgent action, size forces and weapons employed, and tactics, capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities of enemy force.
 - (c) Capabilities and limitations of own forces. Specifically the impact of weather and terrain on relative mobility.
 - (d) Criticality of areas under consideration to the indigenous economy.
- (2) Clear and hold operations maximize the use of indigenous security forces. The division commander may be required to assist in training these forces, and must be prepared to accept the task.
- (3) Clear and hold operations must provide for the early establishment of an intelligence net. Division intelligence activities of the host nation and other U.S. agencies in the division's assigned area.
- (4) Unity of effort is emphasized in clear and hold operations. If command authority over host nation and participating U.S. military and civilian personnel not assigned to the division is delegated to the division commander, he assures unity of effort by establishing formal relationships and by assigning specific tasks to

subordinate elements. If command authority is not delegated, the division commander supports and encourages the full use of coordinating centers or agencies if such devices are in existence, and encourages their establishment if not.

(5) Psychological operations PSYOP) are conducted to:

(a) Promote maximum cooperation from and cohesion within the indigenous populace. Explaining the purpose of the operation to the local populace in order to alleviate their fear, insecurity, and uncertainty, or to counter their hostility, will assist the accomplishment of this task.

(b) Assist in lifting the population from its lethargy, encourage active participation against the insurgents, and convince the people that the government occupation is permanent.

(c) Explain the reasons for restrictions and controls of the populace, and the conditions that must be met before the restrictions are removed. Emphasize the temporary nature of the restrictions if the populace chooses to operate with and work actively for the government cause.

(d) Promote division and discord among the insurgents. Circulate widely a full explanation of the provisions of existing amnesty programs, and encourage the guerrilla units to take advantage of these programs. Convince both the populace and the insurgents of the hopelessness of the insurgents' cause.

(e) encourage government military and civilian personnel in the worth of their cause, stressing their identity with the government efforts.

(f) Publicize exemplary U.S. troop conduct. Capitalize on individual acts of generosity and kindness. The proper and correct behavior of U.S. troops will assist in winning the loyalty and confidence of the local populace for the government's cause.

(6) The establishment of PRC measures which are legal and absolutely essential, and which can be enforced. These measures may include:

(a) Curfew, with due consideration to legitimate needs of the people.

(b) Travel restrictions, imposed by the establishment of fixed and mobile roadblocks and by patrols.

(c) Establishment of restricted areas.

(d) Censorship.

(e) Control of the production, movement storage and distribution of foodstuffs.

(f) Issue of identification cards and photographs to individuals and family groups.

(g) The establishment of a registration system for arms, ammunition, demolitions, all transportation means, drugs, medicines, money, livestock and other essential material.

(h) Control of radio equipment and printing machinery.

(i) The establishment of a reporting system for all absentee workers.

(k) Unannounced search and seizure operations.

(l) Denial of public utilities to areas not under government control.

(m) The establishment of price controls and a rationing system.

(7) A civic action program within the capabilities of the unit is conducted as part of a clear and hold operation. The program is coordinated with local government officials and with appropriate U.S. agencies to:

(a) Determine needs and desires of people.

(b) Encourage participation by citizens.

(c) Insure that all resources available are known.

(8) A clear and hold operation must serve to separate the insurgent from the populace, both physically and psychologically. The insurgent infrastructure in the area to be held must be neutralized or destroyed.

3. Populace and resources control operations, to be successful, must be flexible and able to respond to the specific situation in the area of operations.

Additional studies should be conducted to determine what modifications, if any, are necessary to the ROAD Infantry division's Table of Organization and Equipment to enhance the unit's capability for populace and resources control without detracting from the division's counter-guerrilla capability. The study should emphasize:

1. Specific skills and grades required compared to those authorized.
2. Specific equipment required compared to that authorized.

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